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ABSTRACT 
This examination of the evolution of postwar policies for 
Australian Antarctic science argues that an implicit science 
policy, administered and controlled by a scientific elite, preceded 
the explicit Antarctic science policies of the last decade. This 
scientific elite managed the direction and content of Antarctic 
science by emphasizing Antarctic research goals in terms of 
professional autonomy and independence from political objectives. 
It is revealed that changes in the Australian government's 
political perception of Antarctic issues parallel changes in the 
elite's strategies for and ideology of Antarctic science. 
The nature of Antarctic science and its relation to policy 
is analysed on two levels. The first level examines the social 
organization of Antarctic research with reference to professional 
and peer relations of Antarctic scientists and the internal 
organizational structure of the Antarctic Division. The second 
level places Antarctic science policy within its political 
environment and discusses the extent to which scientists should 
control decision-making regarding scientific activity undertaken 
in the Australian Antarctic Territory. The conclusion suggests 
an alternative model for the formation of Antarctic science policy 
based on utilizing more non-scientific representatives in the 




Scientific research organised and controlled by the 
Australian government has been undertaken in the Australian 
Antarctic Territory since the end of the Second World War. Although 
the motives for Australian involvement in Antarctic science are 
complex, the myth of an apolitical Antarctic science has been 
nurtured by politicians and scientists alike to achieve political 
and scientific advantages over nation states excluded from claimant 
or consultative status under the Antarctic Treaty. Science policy 
has played a crucial role in safeguarding and furthering the 
interests of scientists, politicians and bureaucrats involved in 
the political processes determining Antarctic policy. 
Science policy analyst Jean Jacques Salomon^ points to 
the Antarctic Treaty as one of the few spheres where international 
scientific co-operation transcends competition between states. 
Salomon describes the Treaty as 
... an example of diplomatic and political 
action based on purely scientific motives. 2 
While Salomon does concede that the spirit of co-operation can only 
exist so long as the Antarctic continent provides no ground for 
competition between states, his views reflect and contribute to the 
myth that the activities of the Antarctic scientific community are 
politically neutral. Salomon's views are typical of a gamut of 3 
Antarctic writers who have portrayed the Antarctic scientific 
community as a unique phenomenon: one in which the anomaly of a 
"pure" science untainted by political demands is also the basis 
for a new political order. In fact, this is far from true. The 
Antarctic scientific community is not unique. It is a disparate 
collection of national science organizations. It can be analysed 
in the same way as other scientific communities and exhibits 
characteristics in common with other studies of scientists' 
behaviours in international"^ and national^ laboratories and 
research organizations. 
National science policies can be viewed as the linchpin 
between a society's political processes and the internal 
characteristics of the scientific community. Australian Antarctic 
science policy reflects both the external influences on and the 
internal dynamics of the Australian Antarctic scientific 
establishment. 
The analysis of science policy as a subject of academic research 
is an area of recent interest. In 1977, Joseph Haberer described 
science policy literature in the following terms: 
There has been little evidence that an 
intellectual effort was under way to create 
a more rigorous, comprehensive, comparative 
theory - or even a unifying framework. To a 
considerable degree, we still have a body of 
literature in search of a field. 6 
While much of the literature accepts that factors external to the 
scientific community determine the type of science policy created, 
little work has been done within the sociology of science to 
explain how the internal dynamics of scientific communities, for 
example, their patterns of communication and work organization, 
7 might also affect the type of science policy formulated. 
This thesis examines the processes which have created 
Australian Antarctic science policy. The study seeks to relate 
externalist perspectives of science policy to the internal dynamics 
of the Australian Antarctic scientific community with special 
emphasis on the history and development of the Australian government's 
Antarctic Division. 
The aims of the thesis are as follows: 
To examine postwar management of Antarctic science from 
a national and international perspective. This identifies the 
major institutions and legal instruments which determine the 
direction of Antarctic science (Chapter 2). 
2. To analyse the social organization of Australian Antarctic 
research. A scientific elite in Australian Antarctic science is 
identified. It is argued that this elite formulated and managed 
an "unofficial" science policy which reflected the elite's interests 
for more than two decades. The work organization of the Antarctic 
Division is examined in order to support the argument that a 
restricted research institution, restricted in both the political 
and scientific sense, suited the interests of past Australian 
governments and the scientific elite. An ineffective and restricted 
Antarctic Division preserved the status quo, that is, it did not 
challenge the science-government partnership in the formulation of 
Antarctic science policy and science programs (Chapter 3). 
3. To review and analyse the contribution that the political 
environment has had on the evolution of Antarctic science policy. 
This details government and public responses to the "politicization" 
of Antarctic science. It details the results of parliamentary 
reviews and examines current Antarctic science advisory policy 
machinery (Chapter 4). 
4. To identify the weaknesses in the current Antarctic 
science advisory system and propose improvements to existing 
procedures and arrangements (Chapter 5). 
There are few published studies of the development and 
implementation of Australia's science policy in the Australian 
p 
Antarctic Territory. No accounts are known to exist written 
from a sociology of science perspective which link Australia's 
Antarctic science policy to the maintenance of political power. 
The theoretical framework of this thesis is primarily based on 9 
an "externalist" approach to the sociology of science. An 
externalist approach to science concerns itself with explaining 
scientific practices in terms of social structures and processes 
making this an appropriate framework in which to examine the 
evolution of specific science policies such as Australia's 
Antarctic science policy. The work however, of writers such as 
Richard Whitley^^ and Peter Weingart^^ who are concerned with the 
cognitive aspects of a sociology of science are also acknowledged 
with regard to the role of scientific elites and the changing 
content of Antarctic science. 
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2. POSTWAR MANAGEMENT OF ANTARCTIC SCIENCE 
Antarctic scientific research is performed against a 
complex background of international foreign relations and national 
politics. Styles of management and control of Antarctic science 
programs have their origins in the delicate political negotiations 
undertaken by the superpowers during the Cold War of the 1950's. 
An examination of the historical context of Antarctic science 
is necessary because all the major international institutions 
and government departments involved in the management and 
organization of research programs have exerted a dominant and 
continuous influence on the character of Antarctic science since 
the Second World War. The legal obligations of the Antarctic 
Treaty determine the conditions and limits of research activity 
carried out in Antarctic regions. 
This chapter identifies and describes the major institutions 
and mechanisms involved in postwar management of Antarctic research 
and provides an historical perspective in which to assess the 
structural characteristics of Antarctic science. 
2.1 NATIONAL ANTARCTIC SCIENCE 
The Second World War had a decisive impact on the organization 
and control of Australian scientific activity in the Antarctic. 
Private sponsorship and control of Antarctic expeditions gave way 
to government financed and managed expeditions based on continuing 
programs of polar science. Australia already had a rich history of 
expeditionary science to the Antarctic continent beginning with 
the activities of the Australian Antarctic Exploration Committee 
set up by the Royal Society of Victoria in 1866, continuing with 
Sir Douglas Mawson's 1911-13 Australasian Antarctic Expedition 
8. 
and culminating in the British-Australian-New Zealand Antarctic 
Expedition (BANZARE) of 1929-31 . Australians, many of them 
scientists, also took part in the expeditions of other nations. 
Sir Douglas Mawson, a trained physicist but also experienced as 
a geologist. Professor T.W. Edgeworth David of the University of 
Sydney and geologist Leo Cotton (later to become Professor of 
Geology at the same University) , all took part in Sir Ernest 
Shackleton's expedition of 1907-1909. Shackleton's subsequent 
British Trans-Antarctic Expedition of 1914-17 included Australian 
physicists R.W. Richards and A.K. Jack. 
When Australian scientific activity resumed after the Second 
World War it had undergone significant changes. Expeditions 
were no longer privately organised and sponsored with short term 
objectives. After 1945 expeditions were financed by the Australian 
government and resulted in permanently based and institutionalized 
scientific activity. Government committees planned and controlled 
research programs and - a new government agency, the Antarctic Division, 
was established to develop and execute Antarctic policy. 
Until the International Geophysical Year in 1957-58 which 
established and promoted an international co-operative approach 
to Antarctic scientific activity, and the signing of the Antarctic 
Treaty in 1959 which provided a legal framework for the incorporation 
of national Antarctic science into international science, scientific 
activity in the Australian Antarctic Territory was clearly based 
on national political objectives and priorities. In 1951, William 
Wentworth, M.H.R. for Mackellar, listed the following advantages 
in establishing permanent stations in Antarctica: 
whaling; long-range weather forecasting; geological exploration 
9. 
for mineral resources; the use of the continent's isolation for 
the development of atomic research; the establishment of airline 
bases; tourism; military considerations and scientific research.^ 
In 1953, the Minister for External Affairs, the Rt Hon. R.G. Casey, 
stated: 
The Australian antarctic sector is of vital 
importance to Australia. For strategic reasons 
it is important that this area, lying as it does 
so close to Australia's back door, shall remain 
under Australian control. 2. 
The relationship between Antarctic science and politics had 
already been well established before the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 
"de-politicised" the objectives of Antarctic scientific activity. 
In 1953, Dr Herbert Evatt, Leader of the Federal Labor Party, 
defined the political role of Antarctic science in the following 
terms: 
It is well known that mere exploration or discovery 
of territory such as this which is not followed by 
something more tangible, by something of the nature 
of settlement, usually does not give the country 
concerned a title to the territory ... It is essential 
that what has already been done by exploration should 
be followed up for meteorological purposes, scientific 
development, and also^for the development of minerals, 
if that is possible. 
While political objectives have arguably always underpinned 
Australian scientific activity in the Antarctic, the way in which 
scientific objectives, priorities and policies have been formulated 
and expressed has substantially changed since the Second World 
War. 
The postwar development of a policy for Antarctic science 
can be divided into three phases. Each phase reflects the changing 
involvement of the State in Antarctic affairs. Political interest 
in Antarctic matters reached a peak in the 1950's with the 
establishment of two permanent continental stations, Mawson and 
10. 
Davis. Political interest and concomitant financial commitment 
to a vigorous Antarctic policy had diminished by the latter half 
of the 1960's. Much of the initiative for progress in Antarctic 
matters between 1947 and 1962 can be attributed to the influence 
of a powerful Ministerial committee which controlled every aspect 
of Antarctic affairs. Initially named the Executive Committee 
on Exploration and Exploitation in 1947, it later became known 
as the Executive Planning Committee and finally as the ANARE 
Planning Committee. By 1966, this Committee had ceased to meet 
and was "allowed to wither on the vine"^ by the Australian 
government. 
The early vigorous phase of post-war Antarctic science was 
replaced by a decade of political inaction which was largely 
reflected in the disorganised nature of government programs of 
Antarctic science. The absence of a formal Antarctic policy and 
planning group or an appropriate science advisory body coupled with 
the absence of a coherent and comprehensive government policy for 
national Antarctic activities left a political vacuum. As a 
consequence, the government department meant to manage Antarctic 
activities, the Antarctic Division, stagnated. The Division 
began to be influenced by external professional vested interests, 
largely forfeiting control over the government's Antarctic research 
program. A select group of individuals drawn from certain 
universities and other government departments who were involved 
in pursuing their own programs of Antarctic research took over the 
management and control of Antarctic science in the absence of 
Division leadership. 
The policies of the Whitlam government and renewed 
1 1 . 
international interest in the possibilities for exploitation of 
the Antarctic's mineral and living resources, provided the impetus 
for change in Australia's policy towards Antarctic science after 
1975. By the late 1970's the Australian government had turned its 
interest back on Antarctic matters, in particular, the management 
of government programs of research. The period between 1975 and 
1987 has been characterised by the gradual consolidation of 
government control over the direction of Antarctic science; a 
move from pure science to a greater emphasis on applied or "mission" 
oriented research and to the increased application of scientific 
data and models in the policy making process. 
2.1.1 ANTARCTIC DIVISION 
In 1933 Australia confirmed the transfer of Antarctic 
territory from the British government in the Australian Antarctic 
Territory Acceptance Act. However it was not till after the Second 
World War that the Australian government committed itself in a 
financial and practical way to the Australian Antarctic Territory 
(AAT). Dr Herbert Evatt, Minister for External Affairs, convened 
an inter-departmental committee on 2 December 194 6 to plan the first 
government expedition to the AAT in 1947. This and later expeditions 
were named the Australian National Antarctic Research Expeditions 
(ANARE). 
In 1948, more than fifteen years after accepting formal 
responsibility for 42% or approximately 6 million square kilometres 
of Antarctic territory, the Australian government established a 
permanent Antarctic Division under the Department of External 
Affairs. Acting on the recommendations of the Executive Planning 
Committee, formed in 1947, the Department of External Affairs 
12. 
proposed that a Commonwealth Antarctic Service be set up along 
the lines of the British Discovery Committee and the U.S. Antarctic 
Service. On the 6th April 1948, Cabinet approved the following: 
That some peimianent machinery be set up for 
handling all arrangements for Antarctic expeditions 
many aspects of which are not strictly within the 
scope of the Department of External Affairs. To 
this end a Committee consisting of representatives 
of the Departments of the Treasury, Public Service 
Board, External Affairs and CSIRO shall be set up 
to consider an appropriate organisation. 5 
One of the earliest proposals for an Antarctic Section 
within the Department of External Affairs anticipated a total 
headquarters staff of fourteen people.^ Positions included that 
of Chief Executive Officer, Assistant Executive Officer, Technical 
Assistant, Scientific Assistant, Meteorological Assistant, Supply 
Assistant, Secretary, Marine Assistant, three typists, a Filing 
Clerk, a Stores Clerk and Storeman. 
The Antarctic Division's first Director, Melbourne physicist, 
Mr P.G. Law, was appointed in January 1949. Mr Law had been 
previously employed by the Department of External Affairs as the 
Senior Scientific Officer to the 1947-48 Antarctic expedition. 
The appointment of scientists as the early Directors of the Division 
reflected the view of past Australian Governments that the primary 
focus of Divisional activity should be scientific research. 
Directors were appointed on the basis of their scientific 
qualifications and their knowledge of and experience in logistics. 
Since 1980, a scientific background has not been an essential 
requirement for appointment as Director to the Antarctic Division. 
The Australian government's view of the role of the Division has 
changed resulting in an extensive restructuring of administrative 
and staffing arrangements. Dr Phillip Law, former Director of the 
13. 
Antarctic Division, recently commented on the appointment of 
non-scientists to the Directorship of the Division in the following 
terms : 
My big criticism of the Antarctic Division 
over the last twenty years has been the gradual 
rejection of people with science and Antarctic 
experience as candidates for the top-echelon jobs. 
They keep searching for the administrator with a 
capital "A" and its more or less assumed that if 
you're a sciehtist you can't possibly be an 
administrator. I believe that the head of any 
scientific organisation should be a scientist 
and have a good administrator as Number Two. 
I still believe that the head of the Antarctic 
Division should be a scientist. 7 
The officially stated functions of the Antarctic Division 
have also undergone subtle changes during the last fifteen years. 
In 1972, the functions of the Division were described as "the 
general administration of, and logistic support for" ANARE and 
"carrying out approved programs in various fields of scientific g 
research". In accordance with this clearly defined twofold 
function, the Division had only one Assistant Director position. 
This was the Assistant Director (Scientific) position. In 1985, 
the addition of an overall "program objective" for Antarctic 
activities illustrates the way in which the contextual framework 
of Divisional activities has changed. In the 1980's Antarctic 
research has been given an explicit political purpose: 
To enhance Australia's sovereignty, political, 
scientific, environmental and economic interests 
in Antarctica through the conduct of Antarctic 
research, maintenance of a presence and involvement 
in international Antarctic organizations. 9 
Environmentalist, Keith Suter, correctly observes that the government's 
recent emphasis on "Australian sovereignty" means that. 
This creates the impression that research exists 
for the AAT rather than the AAT for Australian 
research. 10 
Not surprisingly, the organizational structure of the Antarctic 
14. 
Division has been broadened to cover all aspects of its expanded 
functions. In 1985 there were five Assistant Directors covering 
Branches for Projects and Policy, Medicine, Operations, Resource 
Management and Science. 
The bureaucratic history of the Antarctic Division reflects 
the difficulty Australian politicians have traditionally experienced 
when faced with managing national scientific activity. Confusion 
over the functions of the Division has resulted in numerous transfers 
between various government departments. Between 1948 and 1968, the 
Division was responsible to the Department of External Affairs 
indicating that the international relations aspect of Antarctic 
activities was considered paramount. On the 1st May, 1968, the 
Division was transferred to the Department of Supply because it was 
argued that the Division's activities would, 
...more naturally fit in with those of a department 
other than the Department of External Affairs, since 
those activities consist mainly of scientific research 
and the organising of expeditions to Antarctica ... 
because of its extensive experience in both the 
scientific and logistic fields, the Department of 
Supply would be best suited to assume responsibility 
for the work performed by the Antarctic Division. 11 
Presumably, at this time, the logistical nature of the Division's 
activities outweighed its foreign relations aspect. 
After four and a half years, the Division was transferred 
on the 20th December 1972 to the newly established Department of 
Science where it stayed (despite the Department's various name 
changes) until its most recent transfer in 1987. The Division is 
presently responsible to the new Federal Minister for Environment 
and Arts, Senator Graham Richardson. This latest transfer indicates 
another swing in the political perception of Antarctic affairs as 
15 . 
a question of environmental policy rather than science or foreign 
relations. 
The central question of who should be responsible for the 
scientific organization of Antarctic research has proved to be 
problemat ic for the Antarctic Division. Many scientists both 
within and outside the Division have ambiguous views about the 
Division's capacity and right to conduct and control the direction 
of scientific research in the AAT. For many years the Antarctic 
Division fell victim to an "scientific cringe" regarding government 
science. This view was based on the Division's real lack of resources 
to conduct extensive research as well as the vested interests of 
non-government groups who competed for a "slice" of government 
grants for Antarctic science. 
Between 1948 and the late 1960's, the Antarctic Division 
followed a policy of using the organisational structure and 
scientific expertise of other government departments and 
non-government bodies. While it can be argued that this approach 
was the logical result of the Division's lack of specialised 
research staff and resources, an argument can also be made that 
this approach fitted in with an earlier liberal vision of science 
as the natural province of academic and non-government institutions. 
During the first two decades of the Antarctic Division's existence 
the principles of scientific autonomy and external peer group 
authority remained the guiding forces for the organisation of 
science within the Division. 
Prior to 1966, the ANARE Planning Committee exercised 
complete control over the planning and execution of Antarctic 
scientific programs. The Chairman of this Committee was the 
16. 
Minister of External Affairs and included both government and 
non-government representatives. Bodies represented were the 
Australian Academy of Science; Department of External Affairs; 
the Departments of the Treasury, Navy, Army and the Air; the 
Bureau of Meteorology of the Department of Interior; the Bureau 
of Mineral Resources, Geology and Geophysics of the Department 
of National Development; the Division of Fisheries; the Department 
of Primary Industries; the Division of National Mapping of the 
Department of National Development; the Adelaide Mawson Institute 
for Antarctic Research and the University of Adelaide. During 
these early years, non-government bodies had direct input into 
policy-making for Antarctic science. After 1966 the influence 
of these groups diminished to a purely advisory or consultancy 
level. Non-government bodies were no longer formally represented 
in the planning and policy processes of the ANARE. 
During the early period of its existence, the Division 
tended to develop an internal capacity for research in areas not 
serviced by existing government and non-government bodies. The 
Division transferred responsibility for meteorological work to 
the Commonwealth Meteorological Bureau; the Commonwealth Bureau 
of Mineral Resources controlled research in geology, seismology, 
gravitation and magnetism; cartography and survey work were 
carried out by the National Mapping Office; the cosmic rays research 
was the responsibility of the University of Tasmania and, ionospheric 
soundings were carried out by the Commonwealth Ionospheric 
Prediction Service. However, in areas like glaciology, the 
Division was forced to create its own level of expertise in this 
research field in order to compensate for lack of trained 
glaciologists in Australia during the early years of the Antarctic 
17 
Division. Phillip Law states that. 
There were no glaciologists in Australia. The 
Antarctic Division had to "create" glaciology 
by picking up physicists and mathematicians and 
actually training them in glaciology to go and 
do their work. 12 
Staffing arrangements for the Antarctic Division are based 
on a long-term permanent establishment of personnel as well as 
short-term appointments which usually last for three years. 
Short-term staff generally spend one year each for preparation, 
expeditionary observation and analysis of data. Field work is 
organised on a year-round or "wintering" basis as well as short 
summer programs. Total Antarctic Division staff numbers fluctuate 
according to the time of year and type of appointment. 
The ratio of permanent Antarctic Division personnel to 
short-term and expeditionary scientific staff became an area of 
concern within the Antarctic Division between the mid I960's and 
1974. Both an internal committee report to the Director of the 
Division in 1974 and various submissions to the Federal government's 
Advisory Coiranittee on Antarctic Programs of 1974 refer to this 
issue. In 1964 and 1965, the Antarctic Division had only two 
scientists for expedition positions; William Budd employed as a 
glaciologist in 1964 and D.J. Hasick employed as a physicist to 
the 1965 expedition party. By 1966, Divisional staff employed as 
scientists to expedition parties had increased to four physicists, 
two glaciologists and two biologists. In 1967, the number of 
permanent scientific positions to the Division's headquarters 
consisted of only two positions while the number of temporary 
scientific positions to headquarters totalled seven. Of this 
total number of nine scientific positions, six positions were 
18. 
vacant at 10th July, 1967.^^ During the 1960's and early 1970's 
the Division acquired a history of long-term scientific vacancies. 
During this period, the absence of permanent research staff meant 
that the continuity of research programs was broken and the 
analysis of observational data took second place to data collection. 
Many of the submissions to the Advisory Committee on Antarctic 
Programs in 1974 consisted of the views of disgruntled Antarctic 
Division scientific staff who were highly critical of the effect 
of long term staff vacancies on the Division. 
Total Antarctic Division staff has increased gradually 
over the years. During 1972 the Division had a long-term 
establishment of 82 positions which more than doubled in November 
1972 to 192 personnel when short-term scientists and support 
14 
personnel were employed and briefed for the 1973 expedition. 
Of 25 scientific positions listed during this period, 20 positions 
were temporary appointments for expeditions. By 1980 the Division's 
headquarters establishment had grown to 101 positions covering 
administration, research and logistics support.^^ By 1983-84 
total Division staff numbered 208 and of these Science Branch 
staff accounted for 49 fulltime positions, 22 of which consisted 
of headquarters research staff engaged in full time research 
projects.^^ In other words, only ten per cent of total Division 
staff were actually engaged in full time scientific research. 
The Federal government's financial commitment to Antarctica 
has also increased. Separate figures for the Antarctic Division's 
annual expenditure are only listed after 1967. Expenditure 
increased gradually from $2 million in 1967^^ to $8.6 million in 
19. 
18 1977-78 . In 1977, Minister for Science, Senator Webster 
announced plans for a major build-up in Australia's operations in 
Antarctica. Additional funds were to be made available for design 
and feasibility studies for an Australian Antarctic ship; for a 
major rebuilding program at Australia's four stations at Mawson, 
Casey, Davis and at sub-Antarctic Macquarie Island, and, funds would 
also be made available for an increase in staff in the Division. 
While the Division's annual expenditure had increased to $22.9 
19 
million by 1983-84 , actual expenditure on the entire range of 
governmental activities in Antarctica totalled $35.4 million.^^ 21 In 1985-86, the Division's expenditure had grown to $36.9 million 
while total government expenditure on Antarctica had increased to 
22 $42.2 million. The estimated cost of Australia's Antarctic 
23 operations for 1986-87 is $46.3 million. 
Despite the increase in funding to the Antarctic Division, 
the proportion of funding allocated to scientific research is much 
smaller than the appropriation for logistics and has remained 
relatively static over the years. In 1974-75, $3,008,000 or 65% 
of the Antarctic Division's total appropriation was devoted to 
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logistics, while $1,594 ,000 or 35% was available for research. 
In its 1979 report to the Australian government, the Antarctic 
Research Policy Advisory Committee (ARPAC) reported that less than 
14% of the total expenditure on the Antarctic program could be 
attributed to research while 76% went to logistic costs and 10% 25 
for administration. In 1986-87, the proportion of the Division's 
budget allocated to scientific research has increased to 26.9% or 
$11,034,400 while logistical support for expeditions still accounts 2 6 for more than 60% of the Division's total budget. 
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2.1.2 AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR ANTARCTIC RESEARCH 
The Australian National Committee for Antarctic Research 
(ANCAR) grew out of the international scientific activities 
undertaken during the International Geophysical Year (I.G.Y) of 
1957-58. In the expectation that Antarctic science would continue 
after the end of the I.G.Y., the International Council of Scientific 
Unions decided to establish a Special Committee on Antarctic 
Research (SCAR) to co-ordinate Antarctic science after 1958. 
National committees were set up in order to liaise with SCAR. 
The Australian Academy of Science formed ANCAR in 1957. 
In 1959 it consisted of seventeen members many of whom were to 
continue to exert an influence on Antarctic affairs for the next 
15 years. This influence was exerted through membership on ANCAR 
or the ANARE Planning Committee and by participation in reviews 
of Antarctic science undertaken upon Government request. In 1959 
ANCAR's members consisted of Dr. D.F. Martyn (Chief Officer-in-Charge, 
Radio Research Laboratories, CSIRO) as Chairman, Professor K.E. 
Bullen (Professor of Applied Mathematics, University of Sydney) as 
Convenor, r>r. R. Carrick (ANARE biologist), DR. W. Dawbin, Mr L.J. 
Dwyer, Dr. N.H. Fisher, Mr W.J. Gibbs (Director, Meteorology 
Bureau), Dr. G.F. Humphrey, Dr. F.J. Jacka (Scientist, Antarctic 
Division later Director, Mawson Institute), Mr. B.P. Lambert 
(Director of National Mapping), Dr. P.G. Law (Director, Antarctic 
Division), Dr. C.H.B. Priestley (Chief, Division of Meteorological 
Physics, CSIRO), Dr. F. Loewe, Mr J.M. Rayner (later Director, 
Bureau of Mineral Resources, Geology and Geophysics), Commander 
S.R. Schoefield, R.A.N., Dr. F. Stillwell, Dr. F.W.G. White (later 
27 Sir Frederick White, Chairman of CSIRO). 
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ANCAR acts as Australia's formal means of communication 
between the international research organisation, SCAR, and the 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties. ANCAR advises the Australian 
Academy of Science Council on matters relating to Australian 
Antarctic research. The Academy Council is responsible for 
advising Government on Antarctic scientific programs. In 1986, 
ANCAR had ten sub—committees to discuss and advise on work in 
various disciplines. 
The political role of ANCAR is understated in keeping with 
the Academy's role as an "independent" advisor to Government. 
While ANCAR does not formally participate in meetings with the 
Government's delegation to Consultative Meetings of the Antarctic 
Treaty, Directors of the Antarctic Division have traditionally 
been members of ANCAR as well as members of Australia's Antarctic 
Treaty delegation. In 1986, membership of many of ANCAR's 
sub-committees consisted of Antarctic Division scientific staff. 
It is difficult to see how ANCAR could provide neutral, independent 
scientific advice to the Academy Council which, in turn, is 
supposed to provide Government with independent scientific advice 
when so many of its members have been, and still are, employees 
of the Antarctic Division. 
In 1966, the Deputy Secretary of the Department of External 
Affairs requested that the President of the Australian Academy of 
Science establish an "independent committee of scientists" to 
assess the scientific programs of ANARE and provide the Government 
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with a report on their "scientific value". Two of the eight 
members of the Review Committee, Dr. D.F. Martyn and Dr. C.H.B. 
Priestley, were also members of ANCAR. In its summary of 
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conclusions the report listed seven major conclusions. While the 
Committee maintained that the majority of scientific programs had 
been well-conceived and successfully carried out, it also highlighted 
the absence of programs in physical and biological oceanography 
and referred to the limited research undertaken in geological 
studies. The report also concluded that Australia's Antarctic 
scientific activities were biased towards physics programs of 
research. In the 1980's the reverse has become true, that is, 
the government now emphasizes the importance of the environmental 
sciences, particularly marine biology, as a scientific priority 
and geological studies have gained a higher profile as a result 
of the Antarctic Treaty partners' attempts to draw up a minerals 
regime. 
Not surprisingly, the 1967 report opposed the professional-
isation of scientists within the Antarctic Division stating: 
The Committee is not however, of the opinion 
that the Antarctic Division needs to recruit 
a staff of scientists, for it believes that 
the scientific work could be directed adequately 
by scientists in Commonwealth Government 
instrumentalities and in the universities. 29 
Membership of the Review Committee serves as an indicator of the 
institutional interests which determined the Report's biases. 
Four of the eight member Committee were representatives of 
universities with another three drawn from the CSIRO. Two of the 
latter represented CSIRO sections actively involved in Antarctic 
research. 
In his interview with the Review Committee, Dr F. Jacka, 
Director of the Mawson Institute in Adelaide vigorously opposed 
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an increase to Antarctic Division scientific staff. Dr Jacka 
argued that responsibility for most of the Division's scientific 
work should be placed in the hands of university groups who would 
ensure that work be undertaken by Ph.D. candidates rather than the 
lesser qualified staff appointed by the Division.^^ Dr Jacka 
argued that the Division was unable to recruit individuals of the 
highest scientific calibre because of Public Service Board 
insistence on a list of accepted scientific projects which forced 
the Division to recruit personnel to these projects rather than 
vary the program according to the qualifications of the people 
available. Dr Jacka further used the opportunity of the interview 
to inform the Committee about the work of his Institute in polar 
studies. 
Ten years later, Dr Jacka, still a member of ANCAR and 
Director of the Mawson Institute, continued to oppose the upgrading 
of the scientific section within the Antarctic Division to 
Department of Science personnel. He wrote: 
I have claimed before and I still hold the view 
that the requirements for a creative, vigorous 
and productive research organisation have never 
subsisted within the Antarctic Division and I 
believe it is unrealistic to expect that they 
can be achieved... I am very sceptical about 
the possibility of the Antarctic Division 
establishing and sustaining "centres of 
excellence" in any scientific discipline without 
a very strong dependence on universities or 
other research organisations. 31 
Dr Jacka suggested that the Division's Upper Atmosphere Physics 
group move to Adelaide and join the Mawson Institute and offered to, 
...take responsibility for the overall direction 
of the ANARE program of work in the field of upper 
atmohphere physics, including aeronomy and 
magnetospheric physics. 32 
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For many years the direction and development of the Antarctic 
Division's science program was unduly influenced by Antarctic 
scientists like Dr Jacka and others represented in ANCAR and in 
various universities. 
The impact of the Australian Academy of Science report in 
1967 on government policy was minimal. By 1974, the Advisory 
Committee on Antarctic Programs (ACAP) chaired by the former ANCAR 
member. Sir Frederick White, reported that university participation 
had lessened since 1967 and that no Planning Committee had been set 
up to review programs or determine research priorities for Antarctic 
science. 
Two reasons for the Academy reports' low impact on policy-
making with regard to scientific research in the Antarctic are 
that Antarctic issues had a low political profile and the purpose 
of the report was to consolidate the science-government monopoly 
on Antarctic policy-making. Antarctic science only became 
politicized by the government ten years after the initial Academy 
of Science report. In 1967, the Australian Government defined the 
objectives of the advice sought from the Academy in purely 
scientific-technical terms. The Academy responded by providing 
scientific-technical information and certain research and development 
strategies which could never emerge into the political arena. 
However, once the government perceived Antarctic research as a 
problem which extended into other areas of policy-making which 
could affect other interests, Antarctic science became politicized 
and scientists were no longer the only "experts" called upon to 
assess Antarctic science. 
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In 1979, ANCAR prepared a report, Australian Antarctic 
Research: Guidelines for Future Scientific Programs.^^ Like its 
1967 report, ANCAR recommended that research programs in marine 
biology and marine geoscience be strengthened. In keeping with its 
responsibilities to SCAR, ANCAR also recommended greater involvement 
by Australia in the international Biological Investigation of 
Marine Antarctic Systems and Stocks (BIOMASS) project. By this 
time ANCAR's influence had been further diminished by the 
establishment of a new science advisory body, the Antarctic 
Research Policy Advisory Committee (ARPAC) and by years of 
government indifference to ANCAR's advice. Some indication of 
the government's disinterest in acting on external advice can be 
ascertained from the report's Introduction which states: 
There is little point in ANCAR, or ARPAC, 
deteonnining scientific priorities for programs 
if these priorities are later distorted because 
of decisions made within the Department of 
Science and Environment as a result of logistic 
and other considerations. 3 4 
As a national committee of the Australian Academy of 
Science, ANCAR has attempted, if not always successfully, to 
keep politics and science separate. The difficulty, if not 
impossibility, of achieving this objective lies in the unique 
organization of Antarctic science. While most of the Academy's 
national committees are organized according to specific disciplines, 
ANCAR is organized on the basis of a geopolitical region and 
consists of cross disciplinary groups of specialists. Antarctic 
science depends on the logistical resources of national governments 
for its existence. The resources allocated to Antarctic science 
depend on political decisions. The ambiguous nature of Antarctic 
science has meant that ANCAR has, inevitably, come into conflict 
with the Council of the Academy of Science. 
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2.2 INTERNATIONAL ANTARCTIC SCIENCE: A POLITICAL SOLUTION 
International science in Antarctica was achieved on a 
large scale during the International Geophysical Year (IGY) of 
1957-58. The IGY was planned in order to make a comprehensive 
study of the physics of the Earth and its atmosphere. Eleven 
nations established stations on the Antarctic continent and 
undertook research programs in various branches of geophysics 
including aurora and airglow research, glaciology, meteorology, 
cosmic rays, ionosphere, geology, geomagnetism, seismology, 
gravity and some oceanography. In 1959 the total cost of the 
operation was said to exceed £100,000,000 and over 5,000 men 
worked on the continent during this time. ^^ 
Many of the co-operative activities initiated during the 
IGY served as a later model for the legal Articles of the Antarctic 
Treaty. The establishment of World Data Centres facilitated the 
deposit and circulation of scientific results of Antarctic research; 
observers were exchanged between different national expeditions; 
and, all stations co-operated in the exchange of meteorological 
information and its radio despatch to Weather Central, a meteorological 
analysis centre at the U.S. station. Little America. While the 
IGY fostered a spirit of co-operation in the logistics area, there 
is little evidence that scientific projects were actually 
organized and carried out on a transnational basis. Nations still 
preferred to organize and perform their research programs separately. 
The end of the IGY seemed to indicate that a return to the 
potential dangers and controversies which had marked the post-World 
War II period might occur. Prior to the IGY seven nations made 
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daims of sovereignty to parts of the Antarctic continent. Those 
nations claiming sovereignty are Great Britain, Australia, 
New Zealand, France, Norway, Argentina and Chile. National claims 
account for five sixths of the continent while one sixth of the 
continent remains unclaimed. The claims were controversial 
because they were, and still are, based on a fifteenth century 
edict which was developed in the nineteenth century to legitimise 
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colonialist expansion in Africa. This doctrine is based on 
the assumption of terra nullius, or land owned by no-one which 
may be appropriated by effective occupation. There is no clear 
definition of what constitutes "effective occupation". Few of 
the seven original claims could argue "effective occupation" prior 
to and directly after the IGY. Some of the claims overlapped 
and the contradictory nature of these claims had already resulted 
in a number of violent incidents in the early 1950's. Perhaps 
more importantly, the two major world powers, the United States 
and the U.S.S.R. each had a basis for claims of sovereignty but 
had not made direct formal claims and did not recognise the 
validity of other national claims. During this period of the 
Cold War it would have been impossible for both powers to turn 
their backs on the Antarctic continent, leaving it to the competing 
claims of minor powers and potential déstabilisation of the region. 
As a result of the unacceptable political situation which 
existed after the IGY, the U.S. government called a meeting in 
May 1958 of all the claimants plus non-claimants who had participated 
in the IGY. The U.S. Government used scientific research as a 
reason for seeking a more permanent political arrangement for the 
region. A note from the U.S. Government delivered to the Australian 
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Government in Canberra, 2nd May, 1958 states: 
The International Geophysical Year comes to 
a close at the end of 1958. The need for 
co-ordinated scientific research in Antarctica, 
however, will continue for many years into the 
future. Accordingly, it would appear desirable 
...to assure the continuation of the fruitful 
scientific co-operation referred to above. Such 
an arrangement could have the additional advantage 
of preventing unnecessary and undesirable political 
rivalries in that continent, the uneconomic 
expenditure of funds to defend individual national 
interests and the recurrent possibility of 
international misunderstanding. 37 
During this time the relationship between science and politics 
was established which continues to this day and permeates every 
decision made about science undertaken on the Antarctic continent 
Science on the Antarctic continent has always had a dual function 
First, to expand knowledge about the polar environment. Second, 
that the activities involved in the pursuit of scientific object-
ives also serve foreign policy aims. 
2.2.1 SCIENCE AND THE ANTARCTIC TREATY 
The Antarctic Treaty was signed by twelve nations in 1959. 
These twelve original signatories have been joined in later years 
by six additional nations and are referred to as Antarctic 
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Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCP). ATCP's have full voting 
rights at the biennial consultative meetings that take place 
under the Antarctic Treaty System. Acquiring "consultative" 
status or decisiotvroaking rights depends on a nation's demonstrated 
capacity to conduct substantial scientific research programs in 
Antarctica. An additional fourteen nations are known as Non-
Consultative Parties (NCP) to the Treaty and have no voting rights 
The Antarctic Treaty came into force in 19 61. There have 
been thirteen Consultative Meetings between 19 61 and 198 6 which 
29. 
have adopted 154 recommendations for resolutions covering areas 
such as: the facilitation of scientific research; exchange of 
information; interchange of scientific personnel; the establishment 
of specially protected areas and sites of special scientific 
interest (SPA, SSSI); guidelines for tourist and private expeditions; 
telecommunications; meteorology and the conservation of flora and 
fauna. 
The place which science occupies within the Antarctic Treaty 
is unique in international law. One writer describes scientific 
research, the major activity and product of the region as, "the 
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glue binding the Antarctic Treaty system together". The Treaty 
consists of fourteen legal Articles. Of these, two deal specific-
cally with science (Articles II and III) while three of the 
remaining Articles mention conditions relating to scientific 
investigation and scientific personnel (Articles I, VIII, IX). 
Article II provides for freedom of scientific investigation as 
follows : 
Article II 
Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica 
and co-operation toward that end, as applied during 
the International Geophysical Year, shall continue, 
subject to the provisions of the present Treaty. 40 
Article III provides for the exchange of scientific information 
and scientific personnel between Treaty Parties as well as the 
promotion of working arrangements with agencies of the United 
Nations and other international organizations having a "scientific 41 or technical interest in Antarctica". 
Other Articles of the Treaty have the effect of "freezing" 
territorial claims during the thirty year term of the Treaty; 
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establish Antarctica as a demilitarised zone prohibiting the 
use of nuclear weapons and, provide suggestions for working 
arrangements in order to establish conservation measures for 
Antarctica's living resources. 
While the Treaty refers extensively to the conditions and 
conduct of scientific research, the Treaty does not provide a 
forum for decision-making by scientists. Political power in 
Antarctica is held by sixteen political representatives of the 
ATCP's. The consultative process has not been open to scientific 
representatives and there is no formal direct link between the 
Scientific Committee for Antarctic Research (SCAR), the international 
organization charged with promoting and co-ordinating scientific 
activity in the Antarctic, and the consultative parties to the 
Antarctic Treaty. While scientific research has the effect of 
legitimizing the objectives of the Antarctic Treaty, decision-
making regarding the pursuit of science in Antarctica is not 
available to the scientist. Any planning undertaken by scientists 
to develop a policy for science in Antarctica must remain an 
example of what Cynthia Hay refers to as "authority without 
power"^^ and Peter Weingart calls the "politicization of science". 
At a recent international conference on Future Directions 
for the Management of Antarctic Science sponsored by the 
International Institute for Environment and Development, some 
scientists and policymakers argued that the Antarctic Treaty 
mandate to promote international co-operation in scientific 
investigation set out in Article III might be too narrow to cover 
interdisciplinary international programs. Scientists and policy 
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makers at this conference argued that Article III of the Treaty was 
originally designed to establish co-operative links "only when 
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necessary" amongst individual national expeditions rather than 
establish a permanent form of co-ordinated activity. Dr Bruce Davis^^ 
has recently concluded that the present framework for co-operation 
in Antarctica is inadequate to meet increasing demands to improve 
the existing management regime and uses the omissions and ambiguities 
of the Antarctic Treaty to support his argument. 
2.2.2 SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE ON ANTARCTIC RESEARCH (SCAR) 
The Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research was established 
in 1958 to extend and continue the IGY program in Antarctica. SCAR 
is a non-governmental organization and sub-committee of the 
International Council of Scientific Unions. The SCAR Constitution 
charges it with the, 
...initiation, promotion, and co-ordination of 
scientific activity in the Antarctic, with a 
view to framing and reviewing scientific programs 
of circumpolar scope and significance. 4 6 
SCAR has neither the authority nor the financial resources to 
conduct its own programs of scientific research. 
Representation on SCAR consists of one permanent and one 
alternative delegate nominated by each national committee. General 
meetings are held every second year and precede Antarctic Treaty 
biennial meetings. In 1984 SCAR consisted of nine permanent 
discipline-oriented working groups. Each national committee, in 
Australia's case it is ANCAR, appoints a member to each of these 
groups. The scientific programs developed by SCAR are based upon 
the recommendations of these working groups. In addition, SCAR 
may appoint ad hoc groups of specialists to examine special 
problems. In 1984 there were five such groups covering the 
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following issues: Antarctic Climate Research; Antarctic 
Environmental Implications of Possible Mineral Exploration and 
Exploitation; Seals; Southern Ocean Ecosystems and their Living 
Resources; and, Antarctic Sea Ice. 
Without giving reasons why it is necessary to do so, SCAR 
carefully divests itself of any political interests in its 
Constitution which states: 
SCAR will abstain from involvement in political 
and juridical matters, including the formulation 
of management measures for exploitable resources, 
except where SCAR accepts an invitation to advise 
on a problem. However, in formulating its specific 
programs SCAR will take note of the need for the 
acquisition of the scientific knowledge necessary 
for the judicious development and management of the 
resources of the region. 47 
Despite its Constitution which precludes SCAR from providing 
unsolicited scientific and technological advice directly to the 
ATCPs, there have been a number of occasions when SCAR has 
provided the impetus for Antarctic Treaty Parties to consider 
specific questions and place them on the agenda of the next Treaty 
meeting. SCAR can request its national committees to relay 
information to their respective governments. 
During the early years of the Treaty, scientists were not 
reticent about entering political arenas and played an important 
part in developing national Antarctic policy. At the first 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting held in Canberra between 
10th and 24th July, 1961, six of the twelve Australian Delegation 
were scientists or scientific administrators. They included 
P.G. Law, Director of the Antarctic Division; L.J. Dwyer, Director 
of the Bureau of Meteorology; D.F. Martyn, Chief Scientist to 
the Upper Atmosphere Section, CSIRO; R. Carrick, Senior Principal 
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Research Officer, Wildlife Section, CSIRO; D.F. Styles, Assistant 
Director, Antarctic Division; F.J. Jacka, Chief Scientist, 
Antarctic Division. In the 1980's scientific representation on 
Australia's Treaty Delegations is, with the exception of Antarctic 
Division representation, non-existent. 
In 1960 the initiative to create legally binding conservation 
measures came from a report which SCAR submitted through its 
national committees to Treaty Parties. The report was discussed at 
the 1961 Consultative Meeting and resulted in the 1964 Agreed 
Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora. As 
early as 1964, SCAR suggested that the Ross Seal and the Fur Seal 
be designated as protected species. It wasn't till 1966 that 
Treaty parties called for scientific advice from SCAR on this matter 
and it took another six years before Treaty Parties signed the 1972 
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals. 
The most recent resource problem considered by SCAR prior 
to any foiroal discussion of the matter by Treaty parties concerned 
the exploration and exploitation of Antarctic mineral resources. 
In 1973 Antarctic scientists held an informal conference on the 
issue of mineral exploitation in Oslo and SCAR requested its 
working group on geology to research the question. It wasn't till 
1975 that Treaty parties requested SCAR to conduct an environmental 
impact assessment of any potential mineral exploitation in the 
Antarctic and to advise on the ways in which scientific programs 
might be adapted to changing needs. 
It is obvious from the preceding examples that SCAR does 
not merely provide scientific advice upon request. In many cases 
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it is upon SCAR'S initiative that certain resource questions have 
been placed on the agenda of Treaty meetings. SCAR has also 
exerted pressure on governments, through its national committees, 
to draft appropriate conservation regulations. It seems surprising 
then to read the comments of a past President of SCAR, Dr J.H. 
Zumberge, who writes: 
.. .we have managed to keep SCAR clear of involvement 
in the international politics of Antarctica. We 
accomplished this mainly by concentrating on science 
and leaving the politics to the Consultative Parties 
...we have assiduously avoided making recommendations 
of a political nature. 4 8 
These comments illustrate how narrowly Antarctic scientists define 
"politics". By assisting the operation of the Antarctic Treaty 
system, and most recently, by making judgements on the differences 
between exploration and exploitation of mineral resources and the 
viability of extraction, SCAR has become involved in questions 
which require an economic and legal analysis in addition to a 
purely scientific assessment. 
In recent years questions have been raised regarding SCAR's 
capacity to manage large scale interdisciplinary programs. Peter 
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Keage has recently argued for an expanded SCAR Secretariat in 
order that the increasing number of requests for scientific advice 
may be satisfied and to improve communications among SCAR Working 
Groups. In 1985, SCAR operated on a budget of $US 125,000 derived 
from ATCP's.^*^ This sum is inadequate for SCAR's responsibilities 
to provide ATCP's with extensively researched scientific information 
as a basis for policy decisions. 
There is a need for SCAR to review its organization and 
practices. There is some evidence to indicate that this may soon 
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occur. At a meeting of the SCAR Executive Committee at Grenoble, 
France in July 1987 the President of SCAR, Dr C. Lorius, commented 
that the time was coming when SCAR would need to make a conscious 
decision about, 
...whether it preferred to restrict itself to a 
relatively low profile by concentrating on the 
limited task defined in the introduction to the 
Constitution, or whether it wanted to play a 
significant role in all aspects of the growing 
discussions on the future of activities in the 
Antarctic and in world science. 51 
Another indicator of SCAR's changing relationship with the ATCPs 
is the suggestion that, for the first time, SCAR will be represented 
and invited to attend the XIV biennial consultative meeting in 1987. 
These latest developments do not necessarily mean that SCAR 
has acquired a political voice in the Antarctic Treaty system. 
What it does indicate is that the relationship between science 
and policy with respect to determining the scientific research 
agenda in Antarctica is being closely integrated into the political 
objectives of the Antarctic Treaty system. As the Antarctic Treaty 
system comes under greater international scrutiny, it seems 
inevitable that some division between the priorities of the 
scientific community and the management objectives of the program 
managers is likely to occur. After decades of dealing with the 
question of whether to develop research agendas to anticipate the 
policy demands of the ATCPs, SCAR must now face the question of 
how to integrate science with policy. 
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3. THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF ANTARCTIC RESEARCH 
The subject and content of Antarctic science produced by 
Australian scientists in the 1980's differs significantly from 
the research undertaken between 1950 and 1970. The 1970's marked 
a turning point in the content of Antarctic science as government 
policies directed research aims towards political objectives. 
Changes in research practices and procedures, training and 
employment structures have affected the type of research undertaken 
in the Australian Antarctic Territory. The reasons why these 
changes have occurred can be located in specific historical and 
social circumstances as much as in an examination of individual 
scientists' behaviour within an institutional framework. The way 
in which Antarctic scientific production systems have been 
organized has affected the type and content of scientific 
knowledge produced. 
The postwar development of government policies for Antarctic 
science involved the expert advice of a relatively small group of 
elite scientists. For more than two decades this scientific elite 
exercised authority and control over the development of Antarctic 
science in the absence of cohesive government control or public 
interest and participation. It exerted considerable influence 
over the development of a policy for Antarctic science and on 
the organizational structure of the Antarctic Division through 
their determination of research strategies and their influence in 
professional science associations and on government review committees 
While this elite succeeded in retaining a high degree of scientific 
autonomy for Antarctic science for many years, it never managed 
to translate this influence into general policy-making for the 
Australian Antarctic Territory despite the fact that scientific 
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research is the Territory's only product. 
The gradual "politicization" of the Antarctic question has 
meant that scientists are losing some control over the development 
of scientific research priorities, objectives and programs. 
Peter Weingart argues that the influence of scientists on policy 
formulation will depend on the nature of the issue involved so 
that, 
... the impact of scientific knowledge correlates 
inversely with the political scope of the issue 
at hand... the wider the policy implications of a 
particular issue and the further away from being 
limited to the science policy arena, the less 
influential is scientific knowledge in shaping 
the definition of the problem. 1 
Today, the performance of Antarctic science encroaches upon 
questions of environmental management; international legal issues 
such as the ramifications of Law of the Sea conventions for the 
Antarctic area; resource development and international relations. 
The autonomy that members of the Antarctic scientific elite enjoyed 
in the first two decades after the Second World War with regard to 
setting Antarctic research objectives was largely due to the way 
in which Antarctica was politically defined. Control over this 
area of national science policy defaulted to Australian scientists 
until Australian politicians, ecologists and environmentalists 
redefined Antarctic issues in the 1970's in other than scientific-
technical terms. 
3.1 THE ROLE OF SCIENTIFIC ELITES 
Many political theorists have produced arguments on the 
2 role and importance of political and social elites. While these 
4 2 . 
theorists and their works canvas many issues of a theoretical 
nature regarding the development and presence of elites they make 
little or no reference to the role of technical elites in 
scientific communities. 
Contributions from sociologists of science to elite theory 
include the work of writers like Michael Mulkay,^ Richard D. 
Whitley,^ Norbert Elias^ and Peter Weingart^. Michael Mulkay 
argues that scientific communities generate their own elites 
which operate as mediators between the demands of government and 
the development of scientific knowledge. For Mulkay, the examin-
ation of elites provides a mechanism for the combination of the 
internal and external relationships of science. Richard Whitley's 
objective in the study of scientific elites differs from Mulkay 
in so far as he sees the processes of elite formation as essential 
to the study of the institutional framework which structures 
scientific activity. Both writers agree that elites mediate 
between the economic and political demands of the State and the 
scientific objectives of the research community. 
Despite their valuable contributions to an analysis of 
scientific elites neither Mulkay nor Whitley apply their theories 
to empirical material like the role of elites in the formulation 
and evolution of specialized science policy programs. Only the 
work of Wolfgang van den Daele, W. Krohn and Peter Weingart"^ 
attempts to link the formation of technical elites to the political 
g 
regulation and direction of policy guided scientific research. 
This section supports the work of W. van den Daele, Krohn 
and Weingart by attempting to analyse Antarctic science policy 
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in relation to both the political processes which have contributed 
to the elite's formation as well as the internal dynamics of the 
Antarctic scientific establishment. 
The question of whether a scientific elite exists in 
Australian Antarctic science must precede any discussion of the 
role of that elite. An argument can be sustained that a core 
group of scientists did exist in Antarctic science in the earlier 
years of postwar Antarctic science. Some of this group are still 
active in the development of Australian Antarctic science policy. 
Evidence for this position is gained from an examination and 
analysis of the membership of Antarctic science committees, both 
governmental committees like ARPAC and ASAC and non-governmental 
bodies like ANCAR, submissions to government committee reviews, 
the public statements of key figures within this group and the 
pattern of funding to specific individuals and institutions over 
a period of almost three decades. 
A core group of scientific researchers and scientific 
administrators can be identified in postwar Australian Antarctic 
science. Members of this group share more than one of the 
following list of governing characteristics. These characteristics 
include: 
* Lengthy membership of the Australian National 
Committee for Antarctic Research (ANCAR) 
* Former employment as researchers/scientists to 
ANARE or as Antarctic Division permanent staff 
* Membership of non-governmental review committees 
into Antarctic science 
* Membership of governmental review or advisory 
committees into Antarctic science 
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* The presentation of written submissions or the 
appearance as witnesses to either non-governmental 
Committees investigating Antarctic science or 
governmental Committees into the same 
* Overlapping membership between non-governmental 
Antarctic science organizations, governmental 
Antarctic policy making bodies and internal 
government departmental committees dealing with 
Antarctic science 
* Serving as members of the Antarctic Research 
Policy Advisory Committee (ARPAC) to evaluate 
and recommend research proposals for government 
funding while at the same time successfully 
submitting their own research proposals to the 
same Committee 
While there may not be anything contentious about sharing many 
of these characteristics, their commonality amongst a specific 
group of Antarctic scientists indicates that a network of relation-
ships exists which has affected the development of programs of 
Antarctic research. 
The development of an Antarctic scientific elite can be 
divided into an earlier period covering the years between 1947 
to 1975 and a modern period between 1975 and 1987. Certain key 
individuals have exerted a continuing influence on the formulation 
of Antarctic science policy during both periods. The group consists 
of twenty-one male members with a professional or disciplinary 
bias to the physical and earth sciences. Only three of the group 
are involved in the environmental or biological sciences. It is 
no accident that the biological and environmental sciences were 
poorly represented in the early years of postwar Antarctic science. 
It is only recently that social scientists, lawyers and international 
relations experts have submitted and acquired government funding for 
projects on Antarctic issues. A central feature of the Antarctic 
scientific elite is that all have been and in some cases continue 
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to be members of either ANCAR or an ANCAR sub-committee. 
According to the definition given earlier, the Antarctic 
scientific elite is composed of the following group of individuals 
some of whom have ceased to be active in the 1980's. 
Professor W.F. Budd 
Dr. R.G. Chittleborough 
Professor K.D. Cole 
Dr. W.J. Gibbs 
Professor D.H. Green 
Dr. F.J. Jacka 
Dr. K.R. Kerry 
B.P. Lambert 
Dr. P.G. Law 
Professor J.F. Lovering 
Dr. D.J. Lugg 
Dr. H.R. Phillpot 
Chairman 
Department of Meteorology 
University of Melbourne 
Chief 
Division of Resources Management 
W.A. Department of Conservation 
and Environment 
Chairman 
Department of Physics 
La Trobe University 
Director 
Bureau of Meteorology (1962-78) 
Department of Geology 
University of Tasmania 
Director 
Mawson Institute for Antarctic 
Research 




Division of National Mapping 
(1951-1977) 
Director (Former) 
Antarctic Division (1949-1966) 
Vice-President (1966-1977) 
Victorian Institute of Colleges 
Chairman 
School of Earth Sciences and 
Deputy Vice-chancellor (Research) 
University of Melbourne 
Assistant Director (Polar Medicine) 
Antarctic Division 
Department of Meteorology 
University of Melbourne 
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Prof. C.H.B. Priestley 
Dr. P.G. Quilty 
Dr. U. Radok 
J.M. Rayner 
Prof. P. Schwerdtfeger 
Dr. N .A. Streten 
D.F. Styles 
Dr. R.J. Tingey 
Sir F.W.G. White 
Chief 
Meteorological Physics Division 
CSIRO (1946-1973) 
Chairman 
CSIRO Environmental Physics 
Research Laboratories (1972-1978) 
Prof, of Meteorology, 
Monash University (1978-1980) 
Assistant Director (Science) 
Antarctic Division 
Department of Meteorology 
University of Melbourne 
Director (Former) 
Bureau of Mineral Resources, 
Geology and Geophysics (1958-1969) 
Director 
Flinders Institute of Atmospheric 
and Marine Science 
Flinders University of S.A. 
Assistant Director 
Bureau of Meteorology 
Deputy Director 
Antarctic Division (1957-1976) 
Senior Research Scientist (Former) 
Bureau of Mineral Resources 
Geology and Geology 
Now, Department of Geology 
University of Tasmania 
Chairman 
CSIRO (1959-1970) 
Even the most cursory analysis of the above list of names 
and organisations revels certain insights. All members of this 
elite are male; an overriding majority are academically qualified 
as scientists; at least a third of the group specialise in meteorology 
or upper atmosphere physics; university representation is dominated 
by the University of Melbourne; New South Wales, Western Australia 
and Queensland universities have no representation; and, government 
departments like the Bureau of Meteorology and the Bureau of Mineral 
Resources, Geology and Geophysics have had a continuing institutional 
influence on the development of an Antarctic science policy since 
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the Second World War. These points are expanded in detail in 
Appendix 1 which utilises previously described characteristics of 
the elite as criteria for analysis. 
The scientific elite has played an important role in Antarctic 
issues. This role has two main aspects. First, by their represent-
ation on and to the major government committees of review into 
Antarctic science and related matters, they have contributed to the 
impression that Antarctic issues are inexorably tied to scientific-
technical processes and solutions. For almost three decades this 
elite succeeded in creating and maintaining boundaries .between 
Antarctic science and any other type of non-scientific research by 
defining Antarctica to political observers as a strictly "science" 
issue. For many years it has suited politicians to accept this 
definition. A recent example of this attitude can be seen in 
Dr Fred Jacka's public opposition to the creation of an inter-
disciplinary Institute for Antarctic and Southern Ocean Studies 
planned for the University of Tasmania. Dr Jacka questioned 
whether students would be attracted to legal, economic or political 
aspects of Antarctic studies, describing these fields as "window 
dressing" which should be given a low priority where research funding 
was involved.^ As a result of years of collusion between scientists 
and politicians over the public image of the Australian Antarctic 
Territory, any critical discussion of how, and to what end, Australia 
should manage its Antarctic resources has never reached a wider 
public or intellectual forum. 
A second aspect of the role of the scientific elite is the 
way in which it functions as a mediator with the State so that 
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economic and political demands are translated into scientific 
objectives and strategies. The most obvious examples of this 
process can be seen in the recently published series of occasional 
papers commissioned by ASAC. The Fourth Occasional Paper, Australia's 
National Interests in Antarctica and International Considerations 
Affecting Australia's Antarctic Policy; Implications for Australia's 
Antarctic Scientific Research Program (1986) prepared by the 
Department of Foreign Affairs, provides a framework of political 
demands which are answered and translated into suitable scientific 
strategies in ASAC's second occasional paper. Overall Priorities 
in Australian Antarctic Science (198 6) and in the third occasional 
paper. The Role of Australian Antarctic Scientific Activities and 
Priorities for the Scientific Program (1986). The second paper is 
co-ordinated by one member of the scientific elite. Professor J.F, 
Lovering, and contains sections written by another member of the 
elite. Professor W . Budd. The third paper is also written by 
another member of the elite, Dr P.G. Quilty, in consultation with 
Professor W . Budd. 
The fourth paper by the Department of Foreign Affairs suggests 
that Australia's Antarctic research program should aim to serve 
Australia's national interests which are defined as the maintenance 
of sovereignty; environmental protection; continuing scientific 
research necessary to pursue possible economic benefits and, 
increasing Australia's diplomatic standing within the Antarctic 
Treaty system. The second occasional paper translates these 
political demands into specific research objectives. These include 
marine biological and oceanographical research directed in support 
of Australia's role in CCAMLR; research in support of minerals 
exploitation possibilities; research based on the environmental 
effects of human activity; research into global weather and climate; 
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unique Antarctic science and, research into polar support 
technology. 
Daryl E. Chubin and Terence Connolly have examined the 
way in which scientific elites influence the development of 
"research trails" so that scientists select projects under the 
influence of organizational, cultural, political, and intellectual 
factors. Chubin and Connelly argue that scientists employed as 
government adivsors, 
...play a collusive role in defining 'scientific 
merit', encouraging certain research trails and 
creating 'hot' specialties ... And scientists - not 
all, but the advising-consulting-reviewing elite-mediate 
those policies and the funding decisions they warrant. 
The elite ... is in the advantageous position of helping 
both to dispense and to receive extra-local resources. 
The elite legitimates and funds. 10 
There seems little doubt that advisory bodies like ARPAC and 
ASAC have and do operate to direct resources into specific areas 
of research and to translate political demands into scientific 
objectives. However, the direction of Antarctic research is not 
exclusively the result of government policy demands. The program 
of Australian Antarctic science which exists today is the negotiated 
outcome of a dialogue between scientists and politicians. Public 
interest groups have been excluded from participating in the processes 
determining Australia's Antarctic science policy at higher 
administrative levels. While representatives of environmental 
groups are invited to attend public forums on Antarctic science 
policy they have yet to be invited to sit on policy making bodies. 
While government policy may direct Antarctic science projects 
into specific areas like "research into the environmental effects 
of increased human activity", ^^ the way in which this is 
interpreted by Antarctic scientists allows them some latitude in 
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the definition and selection of projects. For example, the third 
ASAC occasional paper co-authored by Dr P.G. Quilty and Professor 
W . Budd, refers to the following environmental research programs 
as ones which should have a high priority: programs to establish 
the hydrocarbon content of Antarctic water masses; programs which 
study the content of the "greenhouse" gases of CO^, CH^ and 
nitrogen oxides in the atmosphere; and monitoring the effects 
of atmospheric nuclear tests in snow strata. In some contrast, 
the second ASAC occasional paper contains a section on environmental 
research written by ASAC member. Professor Alistair J. Gilmour, 
which recommends that environmental research programs should 
concentrate on developing environmental management plans and 
guidelines which could be based on surveying or mapping areas in 
which Antarctic stations, colonies of animals and plant associations 
are located; preparing environmental plans and audits for such 
areas; preparing reviews of Australian Antarctic environmental 
12 
practices; and monitoring critical or potential pollutants. 
The definition of what constitutes "environmental research" differs 
markedly between the two occasional papers. 
An important feature of the Antarctic scientific elite is 
the fact that only a minority of the group have held some degree of 
political influence. Only three individuals. Professor C.H.B. 
Priestley, Sir Frederick White and Professor P. Shcwerdtfeger have 
served as members of government appointed review committees into 
Antarctic science programs. Of these, the first two names belong 
to scientists who had been or were employees of the primary 
government science organization in Australia, the C.S.I.R.O., at 
the time of their appointment to the 1974 Advisory Committee on 
Antarctic Programs. Even the scientist with the most prestige in 
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Australian Antarctic science circles, Dr P.G. Law, never managed 
to sit as a member of either a non-governmental review committee 
like the 1967 Australian Academy of Science committee into Antarctic 
science or the 1974 governmental Advisory Committee on Antarctic 
Programs. it is interesting to note that Dr Law sat on the earliest 
Antarctic advisory committee, the Scientific Advisory Committee 
to the 1947 Executive Planning Committee, with both F.W.G. White and 
C.H.B. Priestley. Dr Law's exclusion from membership of later 
review and advisory committees is not surprising considering the 
Antarctic scientific elite's internal divisions. In the past, these 
divisions were centred on the Australian Academy of Sciences' close 
affinity with the policies of the Australian government. Members 
of the elite who had served on government advisory committees 
regarding Antarctica did not always support the views expressed by 
other members of the elite who had not enjoyed similar political 
favour. 
The first threat to the scientific elite's influence over 
work programs and procedures occurred in 197 3 with the announcement 
that the government had decided to transfer the Antarctic Division 
to Hobart. This constituted a threat to the elite as it removed 
the Division and its resources from local spheres of control like the 
Univeristy of Melbourne and the Bureau of Meteorology. The next 
threat to elite control occurred in 1974 when the Minister for 
Science, Mr. W.L. Morrison, appointed the Advisory Committee on 
Antarctic Programs to review Antarctic scientific programs and stated. 
It is important that research in Antarctica should 
be directed towards goals that will benefit the 
Australian people. 13 
For the first time in its history, Antarctic science was 
asked to account for its activities and results according to 
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non-scientific criteria. 
In 1974, the leader of the Antarctic scientific elite, 
Dr Phillip Law, then Chairman of ANCAR, sent Sir Rutherford 
Robertson, President of the Australian Academy of Science, a 
copy of an article he expected to be published in the Melbourne 
Herald. In his article Dr Law challenged the Minister for Science, 
W.L. Morrison's call for beneficial Antarctic science stating. 
This whole approach is based upon a false premise. 
Australia is not primarily in Antarctica for 
scientific reasons ... it is there to maintain a 
political presence in the last undeveloped continent, 
to maintain a position of vantage in an area in which 
national sovereignties have been for many years 
disputed — If, for political reasons, million 
is to be spent in occupying Antarctic bases, it would 
be stupid not to spend a little more and carry out some 
useful work in what is the world's greatest natural 
scientific laboratory. 
The Minister is asking the wrong questions. 
It is not a matter of trying to assess what practical 
value to Australia the Antarctic researches achieve. 
(Most Antarctic researches have no immediate practical 
value!) It is a matter of answering the fundamental, 
simple question: "Should Australia maintain a physical 
presence in Antarctic for political purposes at a cost 
of about $3 million a year?" If the answer to this is 
"No", then we should think seriously of pulling out and 
saving our money. 14 
Dr Law's views in 1974 are extremely important as they 
herald a significant change in the tactics of Antarctic scientists 
and their future dealings with Australian politicians. Scientists 
began to "politicize" Antarctic science by shifting the emphasis 
for Australia's involvement in Antarctica from scientific reasons 
to political reasons. In his article Dr Law points out that. 
To maintain a presence on the Antarctic 
Continent will cost about 2h million dollars a year 
even if no scientific work at all is attempted. 15 
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Despite the fact that only a small proportion of the elite 
have exercised some degree of political power, an informal network 
of communications has existed between those scientists with direct 
political connections and those without them. An important example 
of what researchers like Diane Crane^^ have identified as the 
operation of "invisible colleges" of scientists, can be seen in 
the events following publication of the Federal Government's 1975 
Green Paper, Towards New Perspectives for Australian Scientific 
Research in Antarctica. In the Foreword to the Green Paper, the 
Minister for Science, W.L. Morrison, referred to the ACAP report 
of 1974 chaired by retired C.S.I.R.O. Chairman, Sir Frederick 
White. The Green Paper also invited comments on the future 
relationship between ANCAR and the establishment of a new Antarctic 
Planning Committee. ANCAR considered the Green Paper in July 1975 
and in September 1975, the Academy Council received ANCAR's comments 
in Document NC 19/75. At this time. Sir Frederick White was a 
member of the Academy Council and ANCAR's comments were referred 
to him and the Executive Secretary for the preparation of an 
Academy submission to go to Government. On the advice of Sir 
Frederick White, the Academy Council refused to transmit ANCAR's 
comments to Government on the grounds that, 
... the comments lack weight, are in many 
cases trivial, and in some cases are liable 
to misinterpretation or incorrect. 17 
In his Memorandum to Officers on the 12th September 1975, 
the Executive Secretary announced the establishment of an ad hoc 
group to examine both the Green Paper and ANCAR's comments in 
order to prepare a position paper for the next meeting of the 
Academy Council. The Memorandum concluded with the following words: 
54 
How far can ANCAR with its present constitution 
discharge the role required of an Academy Committee 
in such matters, namely to prepare comments on 
proposals for national research activities which 
can be endorsed by Council as representing an 
independent and objective judgement of the Academy 
in the interests of Australian science. 18 
Why did ANCAR's comments engender such internal division and 
conflict of interest amongst Academy and Antarctic scientists? 
The reason for the apparent split between the Academy 
Council and its National Committee lies in ANCAR's explicit, and 
therefore unacceptable, exposition of the relationship between 
Antarctic science and politics. After 1975 members of the Antarctic 
scientific elite and Academy officials abandoned the Academy's 
earlier policy of not mixing science with politics. Until 1975, 
most of the members of the elite were involved in promoting the 
idea that Antarctic science was an activity untainted by national 
political aspirations and was carried out in an international 
spirit of scientific co-operation. However, as soon as the 
scientific community's internal priorities and work organization 
were challenged and disrupted by the proposed transfer of the 
Division the elite modified its political philosophy which, in 
turn, influenced the Australian Academy of Science to change its 
policy on Antarctic science. 
The similarities between Dr Law's 1974 article which 
expressed his private views and ANCAR's comments on the Green 
Paper in September 197 5 are striking: 
ANCAR points out that scientific research has never 
been the primary reason for Australian occupation of 
Antarctic Territory. Australian expeditions are 
despatched for political reasons concerned with the 
necessity to preserve an Australian presence in 
Antartica...This being the case, it is submitted 
that the usual Treasury methods of costing scientific 
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research in other spheres of Australian activity 
are not applicable to Australia's Antarctic research. 
A large part of the total cost of maintaining Australian 
stations in Antarctica would be incurred even if no 
scientific research were carried out. It would be 
a worthwhile exercise for a study to be made of the 
costs of maintaining national activity in Antarctica 
at the minimum level needed to attain the political 
objectives. It would then be possible to obtain a 
more realistic figure of the total extra cost of the 
scientific programs. 19 
Despite the fact that the Academy Council refused to accept 
ANCAR's comments on the Green Paper as a valid submission for 
transmission to the Federal Government, the views of the elite 
represented in ANCAR's memberhsip still reached the Government. 
In his reply to Academy President, Professor G.M. Badger, contained 
in a letter of 23 October 1975, Dr Law indicated that the comments 
of ANCAR would still reach the Minister for Science over the names 
2 0 of a number of people acting as private individuals. 
ANCAR's comments on the Green Paper were rejected by the 
Academy Council not only because they covered issues other than 
purely scientific matters. ANCAR's comments were also critical 
of the summary of the 1974 ACAP Report included in the Green Paper. 
More importantly, ANCAR attempted to establish an alternative 
planning and policy-making structure for Antarctic science which 
displaced the potential powers of the Planning Committee recommended 
for establishment by the 1974 ACAP Report. ANCAR's suggestions 
included an expanded role for itself in the planning of Australian 
scientific work in Antarctica. Whereas the ACAP Report assigned 
prominence to the new Planning Committee, ANCAR, in its comments 
on the Green Paper, placed itself at the top of a pyramid of power. 
The committee^s comments suggested that ANCAR would establish the 
broad, medium to long term objectives and priorities of Antarctic 
science and be the source of "integrated scientific advice on 
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21 Antarctic scientific matters". The new Planning Committee, 
in the context ANCAR's suggested objectives and priorities would, 
...define and give priorities to specific 
broad scientific projects aimed at objectives 
selected from those established by ANCAR. 22 
An operations Committee would define and allocate the logistic 
and other resources required annually for scientific projects. 
While it is difficult to pinpoint exactly when and why the 
relationship between Antarctic science and Australian politicians 
changed, by 1975 the scientific elite active in ANCAR between 1974 
and 1977 had contributed to changing the raison d'etre of Antarctic 
science. Scientists began to argue that the Australian Academy of 
Science acknowledged the political motivation for Antarctic activity 
after raising the issue in Council. 
While the Planning Committee as outlined by the 1974 ACAP 
Report never materialised, by 197 9 the Government had established the 
Antarctic Research Policy Advisory Committee (ARPAC). It is important 
to note that the members of the elite who had been active 
between 1974 and 1977 in redefining the purpose of Antarctic science, 
continued to exert an influence over Antarctic science policy by their 
membership and activity in ARPAC. Nine members of the elite active 
in ANCAR during 1974 to 1977 became members of ARPAC or one of its 
committees after 1979. By doing so they exerted a continuing 
influence on the political face of Antarctic science until the 
establishment of the Antarctic Science Advisory Committee (ASAC) in 
1985. 
The years between 1972 and 1975 constituted one of the most 
turbulent periods in Australia's political history since the Second 
57. 
World War. The Whitlam Labor Government followed two decades 
of conservative political power and thought which had been dominated 
by the former Liberal Prime Minister, Sir Robert Menzies. The 
Labor Government's early attempts to make Australian Antarctic 
science accountable ^o both the electorate and the government 
spurred the scientific elite towards a reassessment of their 
traditional philosophy regarding Antarctic scinece. The Liberal 
Fraser Government of 1976 to 1983 did not return Antarctic science 
to the state of minimal government interference enjoyed prior to 
1972. The transfer of the Antarctic Division to Kingston, Tasmania 
was completed in 1981 and the establishment of ARPAC in 1979 
provided the first formal means of communication between Antarctic 
scientists, policy makers and politicians. However ARPAC was 
hamstrung by the continuing reluctance of the conservative Liberal 
Government to make a detailed statement of its long teiro policy 
commitment to the Antarctic. 
Members of the scientific elite active in ARPAC did not 
campaign in the political arena for Antarctic science. The reason 
for this political inactivity lies in ARPACs powers and terms of 
reference. Unlike ASAC, ARPAC was not empowered to direct scientific 
research into specific areas. Its role was purely advisory which 
meant that the internal priorities and objectives of Antarctic 
scientists were not controlled by external policy considerations. 
There is a distinct correlation between the amount of political 
campaigning and lobbying undertaken by Antarctic scientists and the 
extent of external political control applied to Antarctic scientific 
objectives. Australian Antarctic scientists only speak, write and 
act in a political way in periods of crisis. Since the Second 
World War there have been only two periods of crisis which coincide 
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with the election of Labor Governments who have attempted to direct 
Antarctic science into specific areas of research dictated by 
Government policy. 
The argument developed in this section can be summarized as 
follows. Analysis of the Antarctic scientific research community 
indicates the existence of a select group of scientists who have 
exercised influence and control over the development of Antarctic 
science policy since the Second World War. The elite acts in a 
way which defines the boundaries and content of Antarctic research 
and mediates with the State in order to translate political demands 
into scientific objectives. Members of the elite only directly 
engage in political activities when the internal priorities of 
Antarctic science are challenged or if the elite's control over 
scientific resources is appropriated by groups external to the 
scientific community. Until the establishment of ASAC in 1985, 
the scientific elite successfully resisted challenges to its 
control by external groups. The elite is overwhelmingly a politically 
conservative group. Its members support the Antarctic Treaty 
system and none of the group has been involved in supporting the 
campaigns of conservation and environmental groups active in 
Antarctic issues. Despite the fact that Antarctic research is 
geared to political rather that practical or economic objectives, 
the elite is still exerting considerable influence over the selection 
and endorsement of scientific projects. 
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3.2 THE ORGANIZATION OF SCIENCE IN THE ANTARCTIC DIVISION 
The Antarctic Division's organizational structure has 
undergone considerable change since the Division's establishment. 
The development of new organizational forms has followed changes 
in the social environment of Antarctic science. These changes 
include the late professionalization of science within the Division; 
the enactment of legislative and administrative controls since 
1974 which cover the administration of the Australian Antarctic 
Territory with respect to natural resources, environment protection 
and conservation; and, the replacement of informal, decentralized 
planning structures for Antarctic science with a planned, centralized 
science advisory system geared to the needs of government bureaucracy 
While organizational theorists like Arthur Stinchcombe 
have analysed the relations between social structure and the 
development of new organizational forms, few sociologists of science 
have considered or fully analysed the way in which the social 
framework is related to the organization and control of work in the 
sciences. The organization of scientific production systems, in 
particular, their relevance to broader theories in the sociology 
24 of work, remains largely ignored by sociologists of science. 
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The work of Richard A. Whitley is an exception. Whitley argues 
that the organization and control of scientific work is, itself, 
a major structuring framework for knowledge production and validation 
so that scientific knowledge becomes "the product of the social 
2 6 
organization". A major weakness of Whitley's approach must lie 
in its theoretical nature. Whitley does not attempt to relate his 
argximents to case studies, thus leaving much of his work untested. 
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Unlike Whitley, Peter Weingart's work does attempt to 
relate the theory of interacting social and intellectual factors 
in the development of science to observed cases of research activity.^^ 
However, Weingart's work concentrates on the impact of external 
societal forces like governmental policies rather than on the 
internal dynamics of work organization. 
Both Whitley and Weingart's work have relevance for an 
analysis of the social organization of Antarctic science. This 
section attempts to relate the theoretical basis of their work to 
changes in the organization and control of scientific work in the 
Antarctic Division. The organizational structure of the Antarctic 
Division is examined in order to determine what impact internal 
administrative procedures and staffing practices have had on the 
performance of scientific research. The publications record of 
the Division is assessed and provides an indicator of Divisional 
research strengths and weaknesses. The 198 3 Joint Managment Review 
is the only comprehensive examination of the Antarctic Division's 
working procedures carried out since the Division's creation. 
The findings of the Review are discussed in relation to the Division's 
new role within the Antarctic science advisory structure. 
3.2.1 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
Between 1948 and 1987, the Antarctic Division changed its 
system of work administration from what Stinchcombe and Whitley 
refer to as a "craft" system of work administration to a "bureau-
2 8 
cratic" mode of work organization and control. Craft systems of 
work administration are characterized by small clerical staffs, a 
small number of permanent posts, informal communication systems, 
work that is planned and controlled by shop floor workers or foremen, 
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authority systems which are split between the employer and the 
extra-local certifying agencies which produce and control the 
skills required to do the work and, finally, work goals and 
procedures that are not controlled by a single hierarchy in the 
employment organization. In contrast, bureaucratic systems of 
work administration require large clerical staffs, a greater 
number of permanent positions, a formalized communication system, 
work planned in advance by administrative staff and centralized 
authority systems so that work goals and procedures are controlled 
by a single hierarchy in the employment organization. 
If the preceding description of work administration is 
applied to the Antarctic Division it is easy to distinguish a 
distinct transition. The Division employed a craft system of work 
organization for scientific research which was replaced in the late 
1970's with a bureaucratic style of work administration. In June 
1973, permanent Antarctic Division staff numbered 82 positions of 
which 5 were employed as permanent scientists with another 20 
scientific positions designated as temporary appointments or 
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"acting in" positions. By 1983 the Scientific Branch had a total 
staff of 49 full time positions of which 22 were classed as research 
staff. 
In 1974 the ACAP report commented on the Antarctic Division's 
small number of permanent senior scientists and pointed out that 
the planning and supervision of Australian Antarctic programs could 
be compromised by inadequate professional support. Authority over 
many of these early research programs was not vested in the 
Division. For example, the Physics Department of the University 
of Tasmania supervised the cosmic rays program and the University 
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of Melbourne controlled all glaciological research. While government 
departments like the Bureau of Meteorology and certain universities 
continue to participate in the scientific activities of ANARE in 
the 1980's, the Antarctic Division is now responsible for planning, 
implementing and supervising its own scientific programs in fields 
like geology, cosmic rays and meteorology. The planning and policy 
area has also undergone changes towards a bureaucratic mode of work 
administration. Whereas ANCAR previously exerted considerable 
influence over the planning of scientific programs by setting 
priorities and objectives for research, authority for setting work 
goals and procedures is now vested in the Division. 
In 1986 the Division described its administration as 
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"a corporate style of management" and had expanded its organization 
into five Branches with five Assistant Directors and a Deputy 
Director. Between 1955 and 1975, the Division had operated with a 
basic organizational structure divided between a Scientific and an 
Operations or Logistics Section. In 1974 there were two Assistant 
Director positions to cover these areas which also acted, in a token 
way, as Deputy Directors. 
During 1974, the Director of the Antarctic Division, 
Dr Raymond Garrod, called for an in-house working party to consider 
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and present a report on a restructuring of the Division. The 
report's committee consisted of seven staff members which included: 
Chairman Major F. Bond (Senior Physicist, Class 3); Dr W. Budd 
(Senior Glaciologist, Class 3); Mr I. Bird (Senior Engineer, Class 3); 
Mr A. Humphreys (Senior Engineer, Class 3); Mr G. McKinnon 
(Geographic Officer); Mr B. Horton (Engineer, Class 2) and Mr D. Twigg 
(Senior Technical Officer). 
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The Coiranittee exhibited a professional bias towards the 
logistics and engineering side of Antarctic operations with only 
two members of the committee classed as scientists. One member 
of the committee, scientist Dr William Budd (previously described 
as a member of the Antarctic scientific elite), did not approve of 
the working party's final report and submitted his own minority 
report which, in turn, was not approved by the working party. In 
the light of subsequent events in Antarctic science, Dr Budd's 
comments are insightful and have proved to be of greater relevance 
than the recommendations of the Committee. 
The Committee's report concentrated on putting forward two 
major recommendations. First, that the Division should establish 
a permanent Planning Committee in order to plan proposals up to 
four years ahead. Second, that in keeping with the Department of 
Science policy of working within present staff establishment figures, 
a reorganization be facilitated by transferring existing expeditionary 
positions to permanent headquarters positions. 
In his report Dr Budd pointed to the increasing imbalance 
between scientific research staff and logistic and administrative 
staff, claiming that since 1960 the permanent scientific staff had 
diminished by half whereas support staff had increased by almost 4 00 
per cent. Dr Budd suggested that Division scientists should be 
responsible for all scientific work undertaken in their respective 
disciplines regardless of input from outside agencies or other 
government departments. Dr Budd stated. 
The integrated planning of all science disciplines 
for the ANARE is unnecessarily difficult at present 
...It would be most useful to have at least one 
research scientist in each discipline responsible 
for the work. This would also allow considerable 
research in disciplines currently lacking in 
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research activities, eg. geology, geophysics, 
meteorology and oceanography. The complete 
absence of oceanography is deplorable. The 
tremendous cost of the meteorology programs 
contrasts to the lack of research in that area.33 
Dr Budd anticipated the need to increase the niimber of scientists 
within each of the Division disciplines in order to get a balanced 
representation within the overall science program. Dr Budd 
estimated that. 
The minimum is about 5 including several research 
scientists with T.A., T .0. or C.A. (Technical 
Assistant, Technical Officer, Clerical Assistant) 
support. If this were to be provided for all 
disciplines involved in Antarctic research some 
forty people at least would be required. 34 
Dr Budd*s report also drew attention to the low morale of 
headquarters staff and contrasted this with the enthusiasm of 
Division staff working at the University. The organizational 
structure of the Division is given as a reason for the Division's 
low morale. Dr Budd's report supported greater integration with 
universities if the niomber of scientific positions remained limited 
to 1974 levels. Dr Budd argued that professionalization of scientists 
could be achieved if the equivalent of University professorships or 
CSIRO classifications like Senior Principal Research Scientist were 
adopted within the Division. Dr Budd observed that the Division 
had become, 
...a post graduate institute with many theses 
produced and scientists developed who then work 
elsewhere. There has been little opportunity 
available to hold these good scientists for 
Antarctic work. 35 
An interesting postscript to Dr Budd's comments is that the 
classifications of Senior Principal Research Scientist and Principal 
Research Scientist and their scientific salary levels were only 
approved in the Division after 1981. 
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The late professionalization of science within the Antarctic 
Division has meant that, for most of its existence, the Division 
has relied on outside scientific expertise for the content of 
Antarctic science. The lack of employment opportunities for 
scientists interested in pursuing Antarctic research areas on a 
long term basis has resulted in an Antarctic science program which 
has lacked continuity and, in some cases like oceanography, has 
simply stagnated. By not recognizing or encouraging the Division's 
right to conduct high quality research, successive governments 
have effectively short-circuited their control over the direction 
of Antarctic science. Control over the content and conduct of 
Antarctic science has been fragmented between the reigning scientific 
elite and vested interests found in universities and other government 
departments. Belated attempts to restructure the organization of 
the Antarctic Division to provide it with an internal capacity for 
advanced research are probably too late to restore Australia's 
scientific credibility in the Antarctic Treaty system. 
3.2.2 PUBLICATIONS RECORD 
The publication policy of the Antarctic Division is to 
publish in the regular scientific journals wherever possible. 
However, the Division also publishes research in its own range of 
journals and reports if specialized studies are not catered for by 
appropriate journals. In past years the Division's journals 
consisted of the ANARE Scientific Reports which covered publication 
of comprehensive works; the ANARE Interim Reports which catered 
for articles based on preliminary research; the ANARE Data Reports 
which covered numerical or graphical data; and, a series known as 
Technical Notes which published information in the instrumentation 
and logistics area. 
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Today, the Division's scientific journals consist of the 
ANARE Reports which supercede and include the former Scientific 
Reports, Data Reports and Interim Reports. The ANARE Reports 
publish Australian Antarctic research which has undergone external 
review. The Division also publishes the ANARE Research Notes which 
includes the former Technical Notes and provides an avenue for 
the rapid publication of technical data and scientific results. 
By February 1986, 133 Reports had been published.^^ 
In 1973, the Publications Officer of the Antarctic Division, 
M.R.O. Millett, outlined inefficient procedures and delays that 
had occurred in the publication of Antarctic research. Publication 
problems outside the control of the Division had compromised one 
of the basic tenets of the Antarctic Treaty, namely the complete 
and timely international exchange of all scientific research 
obtained by parties to the Treaty. The time lag in publication 
for meteorological and terrestrial magnetism research due to be 
published in the ANARE Data Reports had stretched to more than 
37 five years by 1973. Millett commented: 
It is quite disgraceful that data which have been 
collected at great cost are not readily available 
probably because the Public Service Board either 
will not increase the salaries of the labour required 
or will not even provide and allow clerical category 
officers to get the work done until proper facilities 
are available. 38 
Between 1948 and 1972 the number of publications resulting 
from the work of ANARE gradually increased reaching a peak in 1962 of 
3 9 85 publications for that year. By 1972 this number had fallen 
dramatically to 14 publications for the year, or a level equivalent 
40 to the number of publications for 1950. 
An analysis of ANARE Scientific Reports, Data Reports and 
Interim Reports published between 1950 and 1972 reveals the strengths 
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and weaknesses of the Antarctic scientific program (Table 
TABLE 1 













Terrestrial Magnetism 10 
Upper Atmosphere Physics 10 
Zoology 17 
TOTAL 121 
The medical sciences, geology, botany and oceanography 
account for less than 10 per cent of the total number published. 
In some contrast, two of the eleven disciplines, cosmic rays and 
meteorology, account for 42 per cent of total publications. 
An important omission in the Division's publications is 
the complete absence of reports based on a political, legal or 
social science analysis of Antarctic issues. There is a similar 
lack of published policy documentation. Despite the fact that the 
Division's stated functions do not preclude the publication of 
social science reports, the Division has chosen to limit the 
subject area of its publications. Division officers such as 
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M.R.O. Millett were aware of the shortcomings of the Division's 
narrow approach to publications in 1973. Millett writes: 
It is highly desirable that any publications 
policy should be positive instead of negative. 
The Division should seek to promote its image 
by positive steps to take its own initiative 
in the dissemination of information. Waiting 
only until we are asked for information by 
institutions which have vaguely or accidently C^'O 
heard of ANARE is simply not good enough. The 
time will come when questions will be asked: 
"What is Australia doing in Antarctica and why?" 
The best answer to this question, be it asked 
rhetorically or in deadly earnest, is a positive 
policy to ensure the wide dissemination of the 
results of ANARE's activities. 42 
While Millett points to shortcomings in the Division's 
provision of access and distribution of ANARE publications, it 
is ironical that the question that the Publications Officer poses 
concerns the content and raison d'etre of Antarctic research, not 
its distribution and access. The Division makes no provision in 
its categorization of publishing interests for articles based on 
these topics or questions. 
3.2.3 JOINT MANAGEMENT REVIEW 
A joint management review of the Antarctic Division was 
completed in December 1983. The Steering Committee consisted of 
a Chairman, Mr P.V. Moran, Senior Assistant Commissioner to the 
Public Service Board, and members Dr R.M. Green, Deputy Secretary 
of the Department of Science and Technology, and Mr C.G. McCue, 
Director of the Antarctic Division. Management consultants 
John P. Young and Associates were employed as the Review Team. 
The Permanent Head of the Department of Science requested 
the review on the basis that the Division was "showing signs of 
great managerial stress""^^ which was impairing the Division's 
ability to respond to developing Government policy for Antarctica 
* 
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Included in the newly elected Hawke Labor Government's policy 
for Antarctica was an "increased level and change in direction of 
44 research activity". 
The Management Review's findings included the following: 
Management had become task oriented and had neglected 
long and short term planning effort and program 
establishment. 
Communications were spasmodic and inefficient. The 
absence of an effective management information system 
had resulted in few operation or policy guidelines 
or established procedures. 
Many staff had difficulties understanding the aims 
and objectives of the Division as no adequate 
definition of the role of the Division existed at the 
start of the Review. 
The Division did not have an annual operating plan 
which had resulted in Branches preparing individual 
plans. This practice meant that Branches did not 
understand or were aware of and responsive to the 
requirements of other sections within the organization. 
Personnel practices were marred by lack of any regular 
performance appraisal. Staff selection was geared to 
criteria related to a person's capabilities as an 
expeditioner rather than the personal qualities and 
skills required for the job in question. 
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* Science programs were not prepared and finalised a 
year in advance causing dissatisfaction in the wider 
scientific community about the level and allocation 
of available resources and logistic support. 
* The ten year building program had been poorly handled. 
* Antarctic maps were 20 years old. 
* The Division had neglected to investigate the legal 
status of station officers-in-charge or liability for 
accidents' and the legal basis for the control of 
fishing within the waters of sub-Antarctic islands. 
The Joint Management Review put forward a total of 8 6 
recommendations and suggested that 15 new positions be created 
within the Division. One of these positions was that of Senior 
Principal Research Scientist or a Branch Head for the Science 
Branch. This position was originally proposed by Dr William Budd 
in 1974 in his minority report to the Director of the Antarctic 
Division. The Review also redefined the importance of the Science 
Branch to the success of the Division. The new Science Branch 
would become the Division's "main producer" so that. 
The competence of the Division may well be 
judged by the way it runs its operation and 
the standards it maintains. Excellence, 
however, can only be achieved if the Science 
Branch not only produces but produces work of 
high quality.45 
The Review Team's appraisal of the Science Branch included 
some important comments on procedures for project selection and 
approval. The Review examined the procedures followed by ARPAC 
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for project selection and concluded that: 
...the proper distinction between an advisory 
body, such as ARPAC, and the Executive Authority 
(in this case the Minister and, by delegation, 
the Division) must be made. It is unreasonable 
for part-time members of an advisory body to be 
expected to take responsibility for decisions in 
areas outside their control. It is also unreasonable 
to seek their advice on matters outside their Terms 
of Reference. 46 
The Joint Management Review recommended that Division officers 
not serve on the science advisory committee "to avoid any conflict 
of interest". ^^ 
The Review's recommendations concerning new procedures for 
research project selection effectively curtailed what were obviously 
regarded as the growing powers of ARPAC and the improper external 
involvement of Division officers in policy matters. The Review 
proposed that the Antarctic Division, not ARPAC, advertise for 
applications for research proposals; that ANARE science co-ordinators, 
not ARPAC co-ordinators, arrange for peer assessments and rank 
proposals; that an ANARE Planning Committee, not an ARPAC Ad-Hoc 
Working Group, develop the scientific program; and, that the 
Director of the Antarctic Division, not ARPAC, submit the final 
program to the Minister for approval. 
The most important effect of the Joint Management Review's 
recommendations regarding science was to displace the powers of 
the external science advisory committee, ARPAC, and transfer the 
responsibility and managing role for Australia's Antarctic research 
program back to the internal control of government. Whereas the 
focus of ARPAC had been to open up the processes of research 
project selection and approval to external interests, the transfer 
of responsibility to ANARE, a body administered by the Antarctic 
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Division, closed the door on any direct non-government influence 
on the Antarctic science program. Another important by-product 
of the Review's revised procedures, one which is less obvious, was 
the removal of an important avenue of influence utilised by the 
Antarctic scientific elite which and been active within ARPAC. 
It is not surprising that scientists within the Antarctic 
Division as well as Antarctic scientists in the wider scientific 
community remember ARPAC as a committee geared to their scientific 
interests. Both government and non-government Antarctic scientists 
enjoyed extensive representation and power on ARPAC sub-committees 
which enabled them to set scientific priorities, select and approve 
research proposals and construct an Australian Antarctic science 
program which reflected scientific interests rather than political 
or policy interests. This is no longer the case. While the Antarctic 
Division has expanded its powers over procedures for research project 
selection as suggested by the Joint Management Review, priority areas 
for research are now closely defined by ASAC and ASAC membership is 
not composed of members of the traditional Antarctic scientiific 
elite. 
In December 1986, Marinex Pty. Ltd. completed an Implementation 
Review of the Antarctic Division's Joint Management Review. The 
implementation Review reported that 51 of the original 8 6 recommend-
ations had been implemented, 24 were proceeding or partly adopted 
and 5 were no longer applicable. The Implementation Review reported 
that the procedures for research project selection and approval had 
been successfully modified so that the ARPAC Ad Hoc Working Group had 
been replaced by an ANARE Planning Committee administered by the 
Projects and Policy Branch within the Division (Recommendation 65). 
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Despite the establishment of a new science advisory committee, 
ASAC, the procedures for research selection and approval still follow 
the procedures originally suggested by the Joint Management Review. 
This chapter has argued that the social organization of 
Australian Antarctic science is the result of the interaction of a 
number of factors. In the past the substance and direction of the 
Australian government's program of Antarctic science has been 
heavily influenced by the priorities and objectives of a professional 
scientific elite. By their support for University involvement in 
Antarctic research and their opposition to Antarctic Division control 
over research programs, the elite contributed to retarding the 
development of the Division as one of Australia's primary research 
establishments. A poor administrative structure within the Division 
ensured the lengthy dominance of logistics over science interests. 
While the Joint Management Review marks the end of the Division's 
decline by transferring responsibility for the management of the 
Antarctic science program back to the government. Division scientists 
are no more in control over the content of Antarctic science than 
they were under the influence of the scientific elite. The social 
organization of Antarctic science is a product of the closed 
political environment which determines Australia's role in Antarctic 
matters. 
74. 
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4. SCIENCE POLICY AND THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
The Australian science policy advisory system is still in 
its infancy. No science policy machinery existed in Australia 
prior to 1972 and it was not till 1975 that an Australian Science 
and Technology Council (ASTEC) was established. Despite ASTEC's 
existence successive Australian governments have taken decisions 
on research and development without reference to this body. The 
late Leon Peres formerly a Reader in Political Science at the 
University of Melbourne observed: 
Australian science politics have been either 
very gross or very fine. Gross with respect 
to broad allocations between performance 
sectors, fine with regard to the administrative 
detail of research organization and management. 
Gross or fine, there has been no continuing 
relationship between science and the political 
system and no great demand for scientific output. 1 
Despite the fact that Australian science has not had an 
instrumental role in Australian politics, there are indications 
that the official interaction between science and the political and 
bureaucratic establishment is increasing. The appointment of 
parliamentary inquiries which encompass the Australian Antarctic 
Territory and administrative inquiries like the Joint Management 
Review of the Antarctic Division in 1983, indicate that there is 
a developing trend towards a closer association between Antarctic 
science and Australian politics. 
An important factor in the connection between Antarctic 
science and the government's political objectives has been the way 
in which Antarctic science has become the focus of controversy. 
Government interest in the possibility of minerals exploitation 
in the Antarctic and conservation issues like the overfishing of 
sub-Antarctic waters have attracted greater government and community 
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attention. Increasing demands are being made on the Australian 
government to account for its official activities and decisions 
taken regarding the Australian Antarctic Territory. 
Different views exist concerning how to best achieve a 
satisfactory amalgamation of political objectives with scientific 
programs. Whereas Jarlath Ronayne^ argues that Australian science 
requires the direction of a central co-ordinating body in order to 
effectively achieve national objectives, C.L. Rubenstein^ recognizes 
the fluid nature of the political process which determines national 
goals and concludes that only a multiplicity of decision points 
within the communication network servicing government and research 
institutions will stimulate interaction between the two sectors. 
The establishment and terms of reference of ASAC appears to support 
the second view. The Australian government has chosen to dictate 
policy through a specialized advisory body rather than a centralized 
science policy system. 
4 .1 GOVERNMENT REPORTS 
Some of the more significant official inquiries into 
Australia's activities in the Australian Antarctic Territory 
include the 1974 report of the Advisory Committee on Antarctic 
Programs (ACAP)^; the 1975 Green Paper on Antarctica^; the 1978 
report on the impact of Law of the Sea requirements on the 
Australian Antarctic Territory prepared by the Joint Parliamentary 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence^ and, the 1985 inquiry 
into the natural resources of the territory undertaken by the Senate 
g 
Standing Committee on National Resources. These reports illustrate 
the gradual changes which occurred in the political perception of 
1. 
Australian Antarctica between 1974 and 1985. The ACAP report and 
submissions to the Green Paper in the mid 1970's are characterized 
by an insular outlook and appreciation of Antarctica, choosing to 
concentrate on issues like University involvement in research and 
the inadequate organizational and professional structure of the 
Antarctic Division. Later reports indicate a growing perception of 
Antarctic issues in terms of their global and international 
implications. There is less of an emphasis on internal Australian 
arrangements for research and more attention is given to the 
international context of Antarctic science. 
The principal recommendations of the ACAP report concern 
what Leon Peres has previously described as "fine" science politics 
or a concentration on the administrative detail of research 
organization and management. As a result the report has minimal 
political impact. The Green Paper does at least attempt to place 
Australian Scientific research in Antarctica within a broader 
policy context. Despite its intention to develop a new policy for 
Antarctic science, the Green Paper is flawed by its limited framework 
for discussion. The Green Paper limits itself to a consideration 
of the role of the Antarctic Division and a review of research 
programs. Not surprisingly,responses to the Green Paper became 
bogged in submissions devoted to administrative minutiae based on 
the comments of disgruntled public servants. 
The Green Paper elicited a number of submissions from 
Antarctic Division staff which served to highlight the low morale 
within the Division. For example, the late Gavin Johnstone, a 
biologist in the Division between 1969 and 1987 focussed attention 
on the fact that the position of Assistant Director (Scientific) 
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had not been filled on a permanent basis for ten years despite 
the fact that the incumbent, P.H. Sulzberger, had been working in 
that position for ten years. According to Johnstone, the effect 
of government neglect had been to seriously "underminé' the position 
so that. 
The morale of the Scientific Branch is sapped. 
If 'our masters in Canberra' do not think it 
important to appoint a suitably qualified 
scientist to the position in a permanent 
capacity...what value can they attach to the 
work of the Scientific Branch of the Antarctic 
Division? 9 
Division physicist John Reid also submitted a response to 
the Green Paper which stated that unless the government formulated 
a statement of objectives regarding Antarctica that the Division 
would continue to be gripped by "institutional schizophrenia" where 
the Division did one thing while purporting to do another.^^ Like 
Johnstone, Reid pointed to the "inappropriate logistical orientation 
of the Division"^^ and stated: 
We employ scientists as expeditioners to carry 
through programs. The whole orientation is 
wrong... In fact we employ observers rather 
than scientists and what true research is done 
happens despite the system rather than because 
of it. 12 
Further evidence of mismanagement of the science program was 
submitted by D. Mck, Sharpe (sic), a former Officer-In-Charge at 
Macquarie Island. Mck, Sharpe writes: 
Only 4 out of 19 at Macquarie Island could 
be classed as scientists and much of their 
work was routine and sub-professional and 
capable of being automated or done by 
technicians. It would be difficult to 
total up more than 2 man-years of truly 
scientific work. 13 
The Green Paper also attracted submissions from other 
government and semi-government agencies. In the light of recent 
claims that nuclear tests have been undertaken in the Norwegian 
sector of Antarctica, it would be interesting to determine how 
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much credence was given to the submission of Australian Atomic 
Energy Commission employee, J.M. Holland who wrote: 
We are unaware of any scientific basis for 
Australia adopting an irrevocable position on 
high-level radioactive waste disposal in 
Antarctica...No information has been found 
that preclMdes the technical feasibility of 
Antarctica's use for that purpose.15 
In the final analysis, the Green Paper achieved very little. 
While it fostered discussion within the bureaucratic and scientific 
community, it failed to develop a new policy for the structure and 
functions of the Antarctic Division or to define the role of 
Australian Antarctic science programs within national science 
policy. The new Fraser Liberal-Country Party Coalition government 
of 1975 did not act on the responses initiated by the Green Paper 
or on the results of workshops held in a number of states to discuss 
the Green Paper. 
In 1977 a Sub-Committee of the Joint Parliamentary Committee 
on Foreign Affairs and Defence prepared a research paper on 
Australia's territorial boundaries with special reference to the 
Australian Antarctic Territory. This paper was later incorporated 
into the Interim Report of the Joint Committee and published in 
1978.^^ The Interim Report marks an important turning point in 
governmental attitudes towards Antarctic territory. The Joint 
Committee was the first parliamentary committee since the Second 
World War to investigate aspects of Australia's management of the 
Australian Antarctic Territory and to set out the current state of 
knowledge regarding Antarctic resources. In addition, the report 
marks the first real attempt to define the strategic position of 
Antarctica within Australia's defence system. 
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The original research paper submitted by the Sub-Committee 
on Territorial Boundaries in 1977 contained an extensive section 
on "Australia's Security and Antarctica" which examined the 
military consequences of lapses in the Antarctic Treaty. The 
research paper points out that Australia's strategic thinking and 
defence resources have traditionally concentrated on northern 
defence and neglected consideration of the fact that Australia's 
main population centres are closer to Antarctica than Asia. The 
paper suggests that if the Antarctic Treaty lapsed, 
...the Soviet Union could establish a 
submarine naval base unhampered by the 
requirements of an independent local 
government. Or again, France is coming 
under increasing pressure to halt its 
nuclear testing in French Polynesia,, and 
could be tempted to remove these operations 
to Adelie Land. 17 
The 1978 Interim Report does not include the more detailed 
security assessment found in the research paper although large 
slabs of the research paper on other aspects of Antarctica's 
boundaries are transposed verbatim to the Interim Report. Instead 
of a special section on Australia's security, the Interim Report 
refers briefly to the Defence Department's submission to the Joint 
Committee which declared that the Australian military had identifie^d 
18 "no specifically defence-related requirement" for Antarctic 
defences, preferring to rely on the "continued international 
19 acceptance of the Antarctic Treaty". 
The Interim Report was the first official indication that 
government policy towards Antarctica was due for some changes. 
Both the 1977 research paper and the 1978 Interim Report are the 
only examples of public access documents which link scientific 
interests with strategic and military considerations. While the 
Interim Report is notable for the fact that it does not examine 
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the role of the Antarctic Division in the administration of new 
maritime laws and regulations arising from Law of the Sea 
responsibilities, it does make an oblique reference to the Division's 
expenditure by pointing out. 
To give the claim for sovereignty over the 
area of the Antarctic Territory greater 
international validity, Australia must 
obviously demonstrate a greater interest 
in the Territory...Annual expenditure on 
the Territory and associated research 
programs has been miniscule, much less 
than the cost of one Fill fighter bomber. 20 
In June 1983 the Federal Australian Senate resolved to 
include an examination of the natural resources of the Australian 
Antarctic Territory in the report of the Standing Committee on 
National Resources. The final report of the Committee presented on 
5 December 1985 constitutes the most comprehensive examination by 
a parliamentary committee of issues like the political and legal 
status of Antarctica; the nature and extent of the natural resources 
of the territory; environmental issues; and the role of the 
Commonwealth in the management of the Australian Antarctic Territory. 
The report marks the first successful attempt by an Australian 
government committee to integrate the foreign relations aspects of 
Antarctic issues with national administrative arrangements for 
research. Topics range from the internationalisation of Antarctica 
and global environmental concerns like the impact of human activities 
and resource exploitation on the environment to bureaucratic 
questions concerning suitable procedures for staff selection and 
training for national Antarctic personnel. 
Unlike the 1974 ACAP Report and the 1978 Interim Report into 
territorial boundaries, the Senate Committee report directly 
incorporates substantial extracts of the Antarctic Division's 
submission into the final Report. The Antarctic Division's 
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submission is referred to or directly quoted in relation to the 
following: 
* The activity of foreign fishing fleets in the 
21 
harvesting of krill. 
* The inability of the AAT to sustain a high level 
of commercial fishing except for the area around 
Heard Island.^^ 
* The potential of Antarctic ice as a freshwater 
source although little research had been done 23 on possible adverse effects of iceberg harvesting. 
25 
* The non-foreseeable use of Antarctic coal. 
* The existence of technical problems like "lakes" 
of water under moving ice limiting the activity 2 6 
of onshore exploitation of minerals. 
* Differences between legitimate geophysical research 
and minerals prospecting.^^ 
* The international prestige value of good Antarctic 
research as well as its value to specific disciplines. 
* A report of the progress of the Division's waste 29 disposal program. 
* The activities of the interdepartmental Antarctic 
Environment Committee and recent Division initiatives 
in environmental policy.^^ 
* Suggested limits to tourism.^^ 
* The effect of oil spillages on marine life. The 
Division stated that the effect of oil spillages on 
krill production and offshore fish stocks was unlikely 
32 
to have a significatn effect. 
* Support for the developing minerals regime under the 
Antarctic Treaty provided that environmental-related 
research supports any new system.^^ 
28 
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* The advisability of establishing a specific 
34 Antarctic research fund. 
* The inability of the Division to achieve "Centre of 
Excellence" status.^^ 
* Funding and logistic problems associated with the 
rebuilding program of Antarctic bases.^^ 
* Logistic constraints on annual research programs.^^ 
* Options for improved transport arrangements to the 
AAT.^^ 
* Division procedures for staff selection and training, 
3 9 particularly expeditioners. 
The Senate Standing Committee's report is an important 
document in the growth of the Antarctic Division as a separate 
research organization in the Australian scientific community. 
The Committee's deference to and recognition of the scientific 
expertise of the Division marks an important turning point in 
governmental perception of the role and functions of the Antarctic 
Division. The views expressed by the Division in its evidence to 
the Standing Committee no longer reflected purely logistic or 
administrative concerns. The Division now gave qualitative advice 
on a wide range of issues pertinent to the Antarctic territories. 
The final Report makes 28 recommendations, 6 of which 
directly concern the Antarctic Division. The recommendations 
include the Division undertaking a feasibility study into iceberg 
harvesting; a recommended increase in human and financial resources 
to continue the Division's program of Antarctic waste disposal; 
finalization of Division proposals to reserve areas of the Vestfold 
Hills for environmental protection; recognition and support for 
Division control over Antarctic tourism; a directive that the 
88. 
Division undertake a study of the environmental impact of minerals 
exploitation; and, that an external agency review the adequacy 
of the Division's expeditioner selection and training procedures. 
By far the most significant of the recommendations relating 
to the Division is Recommendation 21 which calls for a Division 
study of the environmental impacts of minerals exploitation. 
Whereas the report recommends that an international body, the 
Scientific Committee of the Convention for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) be responsible for any 
research into the impact of the exploitation of marine resources, 
the Report assigns responsibility for environmental research into 
the possible impacts of mineral development to a national government 
department, the Antarctic Division. Unlike previous years when the 
Australian Government relied on research gained through the Antarctic 
Treaty system from international organizations like SCAR, current 
practice favours greater reliance on national research effort for 
current scientific information as an aid to general policy-making. 
The possibility of resource exploitation in Antarctica has 
had an important effect on the position of science within the 
political environment. Not only has the Federal Government 
consolidated its control over how and by whom a policy for Antarctic 
science is set, but science has now assumed a political role in the 
formulation of Antarctic policy. The most recent report by a 
parliamentary committee, the 1985 Senate Standing Committee's report, 
is a prime example of how scientific advice becomes incorporated 
in policy. 
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4.2 ANTARCTIC SCIENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
The Antarctic Science Advisory Committee (ASAC) was 
established in September 1985 and replaced the Antarctic Research 
Policy Advisory Committee (ARPAC) established in late 1979. 
Membership of ASAC and ARPAC differ in a number of significant 
ways. ARPAC's membership consisted of a relatively diverse group 
of individuals. The original seven member committee included 
two non-government representatives, Dr K.T.H. Farrer, Chief Scientist 
to Kraft Foods Ltd, and Mr R. Woodall, Director of Exploration 
for Western Mining Corporation Ltd. Professor D.E. Caro, Vice-
Chancellor of the University of Tasmania acted as Chairman with 
the remainder of ARPAC's membership evenly divided between government 
departments and universities. In addition to formal membership, 
ARPAC permitted a number of organizations like the Australian 
Science and Technology Council and the Australian National Parks 
and Wildlife Service to provide observers to ARPAC meetings. The 
resignation of Mr R. Woodall in June 1980 was followed by the 
appointment of Mr B. Hopkins, Manager of New Exploration Ventures 
of the Oil and Gas Division of Broken Hill Proprietary Ltd. The 
Australian National Committee for Antarctic Research (ANCAR) of 
the Australian Academy of Science was also admitted as an ARPAC 
observer in 1980. 
ASAC differs from ARPAC insofar as its professional 
representation is less diverse. Membership of ASAC consists of 
representatives exclusively drawn from either universities or 
government departments and agencies. Unlike ARPAC, ASAC does not 
include any commercial representation from the private sector. 
Both science advisory committees have lacked any community group 
representation. ASAC's membership is notable insofar as it is the 
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first Antarctic science advisory committee to include female 
representation in the person of Dr Gillian Triggs, Senior Lecturer 
in Law from the University of Melbourne. 
A clue as to the reasons why ARPAC was replaced by ASAC is 
contained in the Antarctic Division's 1983 Joint Management Review. 
With regard to project selection and approval procedures, this 
Review reported that. 
There is considerable dissatisfaction both 
within the Division and within the wider 
scientific community about the way the 
process has operated. 4 0 
The Review also suggests that ARPAC was being consulted on 
matters outside the committee's terms of reference. The Review 
points out that nearly all the ARPAC Co-ordinators responsible 
for project selection were also Chairmen of relevant sub-committees 
of ANCAR. This meant that they also acted as Australia's represent-
atives on sub-committees of the international organization of SCAR. 
By implication, the Review suggests that improper procedures for 
external peer assessments of research proposals had been followed. 
The potential for vetting projects based on self-interest existed 
so that favoured projects might not only find approval on a national 
level but could also influence the direction of international 
scientific programs formulated by SCAR. 
The Joint Management Review also makes an oblique reference 
to the influence of an Antarctic scientific elite. The Review 
suggests that selection processes for research proposals that were 
internal to the Australian scientific community but independent 
of ARPAC were operating through communication networks based on 
Australian Academy of Science - ANCAR linkages. 41 
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ASAC's major achievement has been the introduction of an 
Antarctic Science Grants Scheme to support Antarctic research. 
The scheme was originally proposed by ARPAC in its initial report 
to the Australian government in November 1979. That report 
recommended that a supplementary fund of $500,000 be created to 
support Antarctic research proposals unlikely to qualify for funding 
from existing grant-in-aid schemes. By late 1986, the new $300,000 
grants scheme funded out of the Antarctic Division's budget had 
4 2 attracted 44 proposals. Research allocations under the scheme 
niombered 28 projects and totalled $282,251 for the 1987-88 Antarctic 
43 
season. The scheme identifies six priority research areas for 
successful proposals: Antarctic environment; Antarctic weather 
and climate; marine science in support of CCAMLR; Antarctic 
geoscience; unique Antarctic science and, for the first time, 
social science research relevant to Antarctica. 
Despite ASAC's success in instituting the grants scheme, 
an influential member of the Antarctic scientific elite recently 
44 
described ASAC as "a disaster". This scientist criticised the 
professional composition of ASAC's membership as well as the system 
of prioritised research areas defined by the grants scheme. The 
fact that ASAC's membership did not include a physicist or biologist 
was seen as a disadvantage with regard to ASAC's role in the Grants 
Scheme. While the Antarctic Division is responsible for an initial 
cull of proposals, ASAC provides final approval for projects funded 
under the scheme and recommends successful projects to the Minister. 
It has been argued that ARPAC's membership attempted to represent 
each discipline with Antarctic science while ASAC's membership is 45 
merely "dominated by government appointees." 
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The ASAC Grants Scheme priority areas also came under some 
criticism from the scientist previously quoted. He argues that 
the priority area, "Antarctic environment", has been left largely 
undefined with the result that biological research proposals have 
dominated this area while marine monitoring programs have tended 
to be excluded. Another priority area, "Antarctic geoscience", 
has attracted such broadly described projects that the possibility 
of minerals prospecting could easily fit within the project's 
title. A serious indictment of criteria followed in the selection 
of Antarctic research proposals has been made by this Antarctic 
scientist who stated that science projects had been evaluated on 
the basis of the number of publications that the project might 
^ 46 generate. 
There seem little doubt that the Australian Antarctic 
science program is currently geared to short term political results 
While the autonomy enjoyed by the old Antarctic scientific elite 
has been eroded by the strictures of ASAC, the objectives defined 
and pursued by ASAC are not necessarily the best alternative 
development. While there is some evidence that Antarctic science 
47 
has become more visible to the general community, it has yet 
to achieve some degree of accountability. 
4.3 PUBLIC INTEREST ANTARCTIC SCIENCE? 
Charles Schwartz has defined "public interest science" in 
terms of working to oppose the military, economic, political and 
communications centralization of power which the utilization of 
4 8 
science and technology encourages. Schwartz states that public 
interest science should try to. 
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...put the resources of scientists at the 
service of those large numbers of people 
furthest from the centers of control rather 
than allowing those few already in the seats 
of power to increase their advantage through 
the use of science. 49 
In the past, Antarctic science has served the national 
interests of the executive and legislative branches of the Australian 
governmental system and the professional interests of a small sector 
of the Australian scientific community. On an international level, 
Antarctic science supports the interests of a restricted group of 
countries which have achieved consultative party status within the 
Antarctic Treaty system. The emergence of environmental interest 
groups into the Antarctic arena has not seriously challenged the 
ruling partnership between science and government. Despite the 
activities of organizations like Greenpeace Australia, the Australian 
Conservation Foundation and The Fund for Animals, environmental 
groups have yet to achieve either a participatory science-citizen 
partnership with regard to Antarctic policy making or the 
transformation of conservation questions into election campaign 
issues. Antarctica has yet to achieve the prominence of a Tasmanian 
rivers campaign or the status of the Daintree Rainforest issue. 
It has taken the environmental movement some time to turn 
its attention to the conservation issues associated with Antarctica. 
The first serious attempt to examine the environmental management 
of Antarctica was by Friends of the Earth author B. Brewster, who 
in 1980 documented the hazardous operations of the United States 
nuclear reactor at McMurdo station between 1962 and 1972.^® In 
1981 members of the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition wrote to 
government members of the Antarctic Treaty urging them to consider 
the establishment of a World Park for the entire Antarctic continent 
and also lobbied against mineral development. 
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Environmental groups like Greenpeace Australia have opted 
to work within the Antarctic Treaty system in order to gain a 
political voice at future Treaty meetings. Under the Treaty, full 
voting rights can only be achieved if nations establish an effective 
presence in Antarctica and conduct a substantial scientific program. 
In February 1987, Greenpeace successfully established a base camp 
at Cape Evans in the Ross Sea. Four Greenpeace scientists recently 
completed the first year of scientific work on the continent. They 
are the first permanent non-government group to have achieved this 
feat and by their actions have forced an opening in the government 
science barricade. 
Despite the actions of Greenpeace, there has been some 
criticism of the environmental movement's strategy regarding 
Antarctica. Timothy Doyle of the School of Australian Environmental 
Studies at Griffith University recently questioned the current 
practice of environmentalists working within the Antarctic Treaty 
framework.^^ Doyle argues that Antarctica has become an issue for 
52 
"a new breed of conservationist" and is dominated by "a handful 
of expert, professional conservationists"^^ and scientists. 
Environmental interest groups concerned with Antarctica seem to 
accept the proposition that Antarctica requires the guidance of 
scientific "experts". They have largely neglected the task of 
convincing the Australian public of the importance of protecting the 
Antarctic environment and of the public's right to be involved in 
any decision making regarding the Australian Antarctic Territory. 
As a result of this failure to inform, there has been no threat or 
challenge to the established model of a science-government 
partnership constituting the only legitimate party in the science 
policy making area. 
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Another reason for the failure to develop a science policy 
based on public interest has been the way in which environmental 
interest groups have concentrated their strategies on following 
a "high-level" international approach to Antarctic issues rather 
than lobby for representation on "low-level" national committees 
like ARPAC and ASAC. There seems little comprehension by the 
environmental lobby that Australian Antarctic policy is developed 
and implemented at the ASAC level. The environmental movement 
has accepted the myth that Antarctic science is apolitical and, in 
doing so, has relinquished any control or influence over Antarctic 
science policy. It is Australian Antarctic science policy which 
determines the type and extent of environmental management programs 
in the AAT. Therefore ASAC should be the local forum for conserv-
ationist's actions and strategies. 
The only way to achieve public involvement in Antarctic 
science policy making is for non-governmental interest groups like 
those represented in the environmental movement to recognize that 
bodies like ASAC are formulating political choices and policies, 
and to adapt their strategies accordingly. Until this is achieved, 
Antarctic science will continue to serve the narrow political 
interests of a few politicians and scientists rather than the 
interests of the wider community. 
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5. TOWARDS A PARTICIPATORY ANTARCTIC SCIENCE POLICY 
This thesis has examined the way in which Australian Antarctic 
science policy has evolved. Against a background of years of 
government indifference, a small group of Antarctic scientists 
exerted considerable influence on the direction and content of 
Antarctic science. This elite formulated an "unofficial" science 
policy based on the professional scientific interests of members of 
the group. Governmental decision-makers did not become involved in 
the details of Antarctic science policy until the late 1970's. The 
reason for this late involvement lies in the nature of the past 
relationship between the Antarctic scientific community and 
Australian politicians. For three decades both groups shared a 
community of aims and interests. As soon as government interests 
diverged from scientific interests, science policy came increasingly 
under the control of the Australian political and bureaucratic 
establishment. Scientific interests were no longer allowed to be 
equated with "the public interest". Australian Antarctic science 
politics has now turned full circle to a situation where the opponents 
of government interests in Antarctica are excluded from participation 
in the political processes determining science policy and scientists 
also have less to say about what sort of research is acceptable. 
A number of points about existing science advisory procedures 
and operations can be made as a result of this study. First, a 
review of ASAC's effectiveness as a science policy making body needs 
to be undertaken. ASAC's base of representation needs to be 
broadened to include specialized policy experts rather than only 
scientists and academics. If the government is seriously committed 
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to environmental management within the Australian Antarctic Territory, 
representation to ASAC could be further democratized by including 
one or more representatives from leading Australian conservation 
groups. 
Secondly, there is room for improvement to the procedures 
utilized to determine Antarctic research priority areas. It is 
obvious that the philosophy of accountability for Antarctic science 
currently holds precedence over the traditional autonomy enjoyed 
by past Australian Antarctic scientists. However, accountability 
seems to be directed to answer narrow political demands rather 
than wider public interests. Not only is there room for granting 
greater autonomy to scientists in the selection of research proposals, 
there is also a need for public interests to be involved in the 
determination of research priority areas. While representatives 
from environmental groups like Greenpeace Australia (N.S.W.), 
Ecofund Australia and the Australian Conservation Foundation did 
make submissions to the first forum conducted by ASAC in October 
1986, they have had no further input into policy making 
to deteinmine final priorities for Antarctic science. 
A healthy Antarctic research program is one which avoids 
imbalance and inequity in the selection of research projects. 
Such an approach would eliminate the need for ASAC priority areas 
and questions like whether a project emanates from the social 
sciences or the "pure" sciences would be irrelevant. There is 
some evidence that changes are occurring in this area. For the 
first time, ASAC Grants Scheme research allocations for 1987-88 
included a few social science projects in the administrative science 
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and legal studies areas. Perhaps it is time that ASAC changes its 
name to one which acknowledges that science is not the only 
legitimate activity in Antarctica. Australia's Antarctic program 
should be based on research which is relevant to the entire range 
of Antarctic interests. These interests are no longer confined 
to the pure sciences. 
Finally, as the only representatives of the wider public 
involved in Antarctic issues, the environmental movement has a 
responsibility to become involved in fostering the growth of "public 
interest" Antarctic science which reflects community concerns. 
For example, Australian Antarctic scientists have undertaken little 
research on the effect of chloroflurocarbons on Antarctic ozone 
levels, choosing to concentrate research on the "greenhouse" effect. 
Australia's proximity to Antarctica would seem to suggest that this 
is an area in which additional research could be done. Australian 
environmental groups have failed to initiate any sort of campaign 
which links the results of Australian Antarctic research to 
legislative and environmental controls on common pollutants. 
All of the above points indicate that Australia's Antarctic 
research system needs to be opened up to the research interests 
of groups other than government and university scientists. 
Democratizing Antarctic science would contribute to the establishment 
of public interest science and research. It is time to destroy the 
myth that Antarctica belongs only to the scientist. 
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